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INTRODUCTION
We are used to thinking about law and religion as presenting questions of church
and state. On one side, we have the law and the politics that produces law. On the
other side, we have religious believers and the institutions and communities that they
create. We then ask ourselves the proper structure of the relationship between church
and state. When may the law legitimately regulate the religious behavior of the believer? When may the believer infuse the law with religious content through the
democratic process? Do we believe in strict separation of church and state? The accommodation of religion? Some more dramatic vision such as theocracy or laïcité?
The structures of these debates are well established, and the minuet of argument and
counterargument has largely been choreographed. Framing law and religion as a
question of church and state, however, obscures the fact that increasingly questions
involving law and religion play out in a particular context, namely the market.1
Adam Smith declared that mankind has a natural tendency to “truck [and] barter.”2
Markets, however, are not natural. Rather, they are social achievements, achievements that rest on an intricate web of norms and institutions. Much of our law is thus

* Copyright © 2017 Nathan B. Oman.
† Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I would like to
thank Angela Banks, Sam Brunson, Tara Grove, Michael Helfand, Alli Larsen, James Stern,
and Tim Zick for detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I also benefited from
comments at faculty workshops at Washington University in St. Louis and William & Mary
Law School. All errors remain, of course, my sole responsibility. Bria Cunningham and Evan
Feely provided excellent research assistance. As always, I thank Heather.
1. See generally Nathan B. Oman, The Need for a Law of Church and Market, 64 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 141 (2015).
2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 17 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. Chi. Press 1976) (1776).
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devoted to constructing the market. Likewise, the central legal debates of the last
century have been dominated by the question of the extent to which market activity
should be controlled by state actors.3 In short, the law is not neutral or irrelevant to
the shape of the market. What is the proper relationship between religion and the
market? Current cases testify that this is hotly contested ground. 4 Because the law
cannot but shape the form of the market, it also cannot but structure the relationship
between religion and commerce. What should be the structure and content of that
relationship?
Answering the question of how the law ought to structure the relationship between
religion and the market requires that we address the issue directly. On the whole,
however, legal intellectuals have asked this question only obliquely. 5 Hence, we have
debates about whether corporations can exercise religion, 6 or else conflicts over the
proper place of religion in the market are crammed awkwardly into narratives about
constitutional law and the rise of the modern regulatory state. The problem with such
approaches is that they clutter the question of how the law should structure the relationship between religion and the market with extraneous concerns to the point where
the issue is seen only in a glass darkly, if at all. This Article seeks to move this discussion forward in two ways: First, it explicitly articulates three competing normative visions of how the law could structure the relationship between religion and the
marketplace. Second, it applies these theories to a concrete and current conflict over
the relationship between commerce and religious faith.
Perhaps the most hotly contested question of law, commerce, and religion today
centers on the conflicts between religious believers and antidiscrimination laws created by the advent of same-sex marriage. The last two decades have seen a sea change
in American attitudes toward same-sex marriage. Most dramatically, the Supreme
Court declared in Obergefell v. Hodges that gays and lesbians have a constitutional
right to marry their partners.7 Despite this shift, however, many Americans continue
to have strong religious objections to same-sex marriage. Conflicts arise when these

3. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY
(2002) (discussing the many legal and policy disputes revolving around economic issues);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 (1991) (same).
4. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in
violation of the company’s dress code); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2787 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (holding that religious employers could claim an exemption from the mandate to provide certain forms of contraception to employees).
5. There are, of course, some notable exceptions. See, e.g., Michael A. Helfand & Barak
D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769, 770 (2015);
Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 891 (2009); Mark
L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 59, 62 (2013).
6. See Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory
of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 273,
274 (2014); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1568
(2013); Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 70 (2013).
7. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015).
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religious objectors operate businesses that same-sex couples call upon to assist in
celebrating their weddings. For some religious believers such involvement constitutes unacceptable complicity in a ceremony to which they have deep religious objections. When the businesses in question, however, are subject to antidiscrimination
laws covering sexual orientation, the refusal to provide services to a gay or lesbian
couple is a legal wrong that can give rise to substantial fines and money damages.
This debate has been fought using the familiar language of church and state. However, it represents more than a fight over the limits of religious liberty. Because the
religious objectors are also commercial actors operating within a market, the debate
raises the broader question of the proper role of religion in the market. It thus provides a useful case study on this broader question.
This Article addresses the question of law, religion, and the market directly. It
does so by developing three theories of how one might conceptualize the proper relationship between commerce and religion. The first two theories I offer are not
meant to be summaries of any position explicitly articulated by any particular
thinker. There is a paucity of explicit reflection on the question of markets and religion and virtually no effort to generate broad legal theories of that relationship.8 Rather, these theories are an attempt to explicitly articulate clusters of intuitions that
seem to travel together. My hope is to show that these largely inchoate intuitions
have a coherent structure and that it is easier to work out their implications and judge
their merits when they are explicitly articulated. Any such attempt, of course, runs
the risk of creating a straw man. My hope is that the gains in clarity and simplicity
justify running that risk. Furthermore, I believe that something like one of these two
theories forms the basic assumptions of most of those involved in debates at the intersections of law, religion, and commerce. The third approach, which I label the
doux-commerce theory, builds on arguments that I have advanced elsewhere.9 Doux
commerce means “sweet commerce.” The theory harks back to eighteenth-century
theorists of the market such as Montesquieu and Adam Smith who lauded the social

8. There is, of course, a religious literature offering theological reflections on commercial life. See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (Madison Books
1991) (1982); MAXIME RODINSON, ISLAM AND CAPITALISM (Brian Pearce trans., Saqi Books
2007) (1966). Likewise, since Max Weber offered his theory of economic development in
Protestantism and the Spirit of Capitalism, economic historians have also generated a literature on the role of religion in commercial life. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND
THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge 1992) (1930); see also Ephraim
Fischoff, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The History of a Controversy, 11
SOC. RES. 53, 53–54 (1944). What is lacking is a literature by legal scholars explicitly asking
the normative question of how the law ought to structure the relationship between religion and
markets.
9. See NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016); Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation
for Contract Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 183 (2012); cf. DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS
DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE MODERN WORLD 40–47 (2010) (“Markets and
innovation . . . are consistent with an ethical life.”); DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS
VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN AGE OF COMMERCE 1–8 (2006) (“The claim here is that modern capitalism does not need to be offset to be good. Capitalism can on the contrary be virtuous.”);
Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177, 182 (1994).
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and political effects of markets.10 I offer it as an attractive alternative to the other two
approaches.
To those familiar with the debates on law and religion, my discussion in this
Article will seem oddly truncated. I will not discuss questions of constitutional doctrine. I will not address myself to the institutional issue of whether this question
should be resolved by courts or legislatures. This is a deliberate choice. These are all
important questions, but they are not the question that I am answering in this Article.
Rather, my goal is to keep the basic normative issue of the market’s proper structure
and religion’s relationship to commerce in the foreground. Based on a theory of religion’s role in a well-functioning market, how should this conflict be resolved? The
other questions can be left for another day.
The first approach is what I label the public theory of the market. It posits that
norms of equal respect associated with liberal democratic institutions should be extended to market actors. On the question of religious objectors to same-sex marriage
and antidiscrimination laws, its implications are incoherent or at least indeterminate.
Partisans of both antidiscrimination laws and religious exemptions can invoke
equally plausible arguments based on equality and dignity in favor of their positions.
I label the second approach the private theory of the market. It posits that any market
outcome is legitimate so long as it results from voluntary contracts. This counsels
against antidiscrimination laws in general, but provides no particular justification for
religious exemptions.
The doux-commerce theory I advance sees markets as serving an important public
function in managing religious, ethnic, and ideological pluralism and fostering an
ethic of peaceful cooperation. Markets are unable to perform these functions, however, if they are dominated by the norms we rightly impose on democratic institutions, if they are segregated on tribal lines, or if some groups are systematically excluded from meaningfully participating in commerce. Accordingly, the case for both
antidiscrimination laws and religious exemptions is empirically contingent. Aggressive antidiscrimination laws may be necessary to ensure meaningful access to the
market, but where instances of religious discrimination are uncommon, there is no
compelling justification for punishing idiosyncratic religious behavior. Indeed, doing
so will tend to degrade the value of markets. The great advantage of this approach is
that it avoids the need to adjudicate between dueling claims to injured dignity. Gay
or lesbian couples insist that any religious exemption from antidiscrimination laws
fails to treat them with the respect to which they are entitled. Religious believers, in
turn, claim that punishing them for refusing to violate their consciences fails to treat
them with respect. Requiring that they abandon their religious convictions or abandon their profession is an affront to their dignity. The doux-commerce theory does
not require that we resolve this intractable dispute.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on the rise of samesex marriage and the conflict between antidiscrimination laws and religious objectors. Part II articulates and analyzes the public theory of the market and the private

10. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller
& Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989); SMITH, supra note 2. For the canonical scholarly
treatment of the history of the doux-commerce argument, see generally ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM
BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
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theory of the market. Part III offers the doux-commerce theory as an alternative, applies it to the debate over same-sex weddings and antidiscrimination laws, and considers objections and possible responses. The Article then concludes.
I. RELIGION, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE SCOPE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The last two decades have seen a dramatic shift in American attitudes towards
same-sex marriage and homosexuality. When he ran for president in 2008, Barack
Obama was on the record as opposing the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, a
position that he said was based in part on his Christian religious beliefs.11 In 2012,
he publically shifted his position, announcing that he now supported same-sex marriage.12 His shifting opinions mirror those of many in the United States. Gallup began
tracking American attitudes towards same-sex marriage in 1996.13 In that year, 27%
of Americans supported legal recognition for same-sex marriage while 68% opposed
it.14 By 2014, 55% supported legal recognition while 42% opposed it.15 In 2015,
twelve states (and the District of Columbia) had adopted same-sex marriage either
by ballot initiative or legislation.16 In five states, the state supreme court had held
that same-sex marriage is mandated as a matter of state constitutional law. 17 Finally,
the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires all states to recognize and solemnize same-sex marriages.18 Despite this shift
in laws and attitudes, however, a very sizeable minority of the population remains
opposed to same-sex marriage or is deeply ambivalent about it. Like President
Obama’s pre-2012 ambivalence, the ground for their opposition tends to be
religious.19

11. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 222–24 (2006).
12. Phil Gast, Obama Announces He Supports Same-Sex Marriage, CNN (May 9, 2012,
9:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/09/politics/obama-same-sex-marriage/index.html
[https://perma.cc/JR6F-UV8G].
13. See Justin McCarthy, Same-Sex Marriage Support Reaches New High at 55%,
GALLUP (May 21, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/169640/sex-marriage-support-reaches
-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/8UCY-2RHT].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc
/6R4B-CYE9].
17. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,
948 (Mass. 2003); Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 889 (N.M. 2013).
18. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604, 2607–08 (2015).
19. For example, among the religiously unaffiliated support for same-sex marriage is (as
of 2016) 80%, among white mainline Protestants and Catholics it is 64% and 58% respectively, among black Protestants it is 39%, and among white Evangelical Protestants it is 27%.
Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES. CTR. RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (May 12, 2016),
http://www.pewforum.org/2016/05/12/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage/ [https://perma.cc
/ZK49-Y3M5]; see also Kelly Catherine Chapman, Note, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public
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Sexual orientation is not a protected category under federal antidiscrimination
legislation,20 although the EEOC recently claimed it has jurisdiction to decide employment discrimination claims based on sexual orientation under Title VII. 21 The
EEOC’s position, however, has been rejected by all of the circuit courts of appeal
that have addressed the issue.22 There has also been executive action extending antidiscrimination protections in federal employment to gays and lesbians. 23 In addition,
numerous states and municipalities have passed laws protecting gays and lesbians
from discrimination in employment, housing, and/or public accommodations.24 In

Accommodations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100
GEO. L.J. 1783, 1795–1803 (2012) (discussing the role of religion and the passage of public
accommodations laws covering sexual orientation).
20. See 1 SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 6:1 (Karen Moulding ed. 2015) (“Unless
there is specific state or local legislation laws [sic] specifically that proscribees [sic] discrimination in employment against lesbians, and gays, bisexual or transgender . . . people in employment (and very little such legislation exists), such discrimination is not unlawful.”). But
see infra note 24 (listing numerous state antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation).
21. See Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *4–6
(July 15, 2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120133080.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPW6
-GSCX] (reasoning that because sexual orientation is inherently a “sex-based consideration[],”
Title VII covers sexual orientation discrimination claims as sex discrimination).
22. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
that sexual orientation is not a protected classification under Title VII); Medina v. Income
Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (same); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,
398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005) (same); Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951
(7th Cir. 2002) (same); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir.
2001) (same); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (same);
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (same);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Williamson v.
A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (same); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (same).
23. See Exec. Order No. 13,087, 3 C.F.R., 1999 Comp., p. 191 (1998). Similar protections
have been created by executive order under antidiscrimination laws governing federal procurement. See Exec. Order No. 13,672, 3 C.F.R., 2014 Comp., p. 28283 (2014).
24. In 1977 the District of Columbia was the first major American jurisdiction to pass a
nondiscrimination law covering sexual orientation. See Human Rights Act of 1977, 24 D.C.
Reg. 2830 (Sept. 28, 1977). Sixteen states have followed the District since then, banning discrimination in one or more of the following areas: employment, housing, public accommodations, and other areas. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502, -601 (2015); Act of April 23,
2009, Pub. Act No. 09-13, § 3, 2009 Conn. Acts 78, 79 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 46b-20); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 46034604 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711
(Supp. 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (West Supp. 2015); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 489-3 (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (West Supp. 2015); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West Supp. 2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (LexisNexis
2014); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-304, -606, -705 (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 2015);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08, .09, .11(1), .16(1) (West 2012 & Supp. 2016); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 118.020 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.330 (LexisNexis
2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.070 (LexisNexis 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354A:6, :7, :8, :10, :16, :17 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp. 2015); N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney 2009); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 313 (McKinney 2009); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.850(1) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030, .403 (2015); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS
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some jurisdictions, this latter category is extended beyond its traditional meaning.
Under federal antidiscrimination laws, public accommodations include only hotels,
restaurants, and places of public entertainment. 25 It does not include retailers or other
businesses generally open to the public. 26 However, many state and local antidiscrimination laws cover all businesses open to the public.27 These laws have created conflicts with business owners that object on religious grounds to participation
in same-sex nuptials. In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, a New Mexico wedding
photographer ran afoul of state antidiscrimination laws when she refused to photograph a same-sex wedding, citing religious objections.28 In Oregon, a baker with
similar religious objections was fined $135,000 for refusing to bake a wedding cake
for a same-sex couple.29
These and other cases have led to calls to amend antidiscrimination laws to allow
for religious exemptions or to include such exemptions in any new antidiscrimination
laws. In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Employment Division v.
Smith,30 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which instructs courts to apply a strict scrutiny balancing test to laws that burden religious

§ 11-24-2 (2002); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5.1-8 (2003 & Supp. 2015); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §
34-37-4 (2011); Antidiscrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments, 2015 Utah Laws
68; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4502(a), 4503 (2014 & Supp. 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495(a) (2009 & Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (West 2008); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (West Supp. 2016); Act of Mar. 2, 1982, ch. 112, 1981 Wis. Sess.
Laws 901; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.31(2) (West Supp. 2015).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (“Each of the following establishments which serves
the public is a place of public accommodation . . . any inn, hotel, motel . . . ; any restaurant,
cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises . . . ; any motion picture house, theater, concert
hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and any establishment
which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered . . .
and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”).
26. The Supreme Court, however, has held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 does generally prohibit discrimination on the basis of race in private contracting. See Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968). However, this prohibition does not extend to religion,
national origin, or other categories protected under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and other federal
antidiscrimination laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”).
27. For example, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act covers “all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2016). Indeed, it bans not only
discrimination against customers seeking services from businesses open to the public, but also
states, “No business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott
or blacklist, or refuse to buy from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state
on account of any [protected] characteristics.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2007).
28. 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (holding that there was no constitutional objection to the
application of the antidiscrimination ordinance and that New Mexico’s religious freedom act
did not apply to the case).
29. See Shelby Sebens, Judge: Oregon Bakery Should Pay Gay Couple $135,000 over
Wedding Cake, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2015, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa
-oregon-gaymarriage-idUSKBN0NJ2JE20150428 [https://perma.cc/9LXP-KFS2].
30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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exercise.31 RFRA alone has never been used successfully to challenge federal antidiscrimination laws, and after the Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, it does
not apply to state laws.32 Numerous state legislatures, however, have passed their
own versions of RFRA, which do apply to state laws. 33 To date, no state RFRA has
been interpreted to grant an exemption from a state antidiscrimination law covering
sexual orientation.34 In the Elane Photography case, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that New Mexico’s RFRA did not apply to private causes of action.35 In response, Arizona sought to amend its state RFRA to explicitly include private suits. 36
While Arizona has no statewide law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, the proposed amendment was widely seen as taking aim at antidiscrimination laws—although it did not mention them. The resulting public outcry
against efforts to “license discrimination” included calls to boycott the state, and
Arizona’s governor vetoed the law. 37 Indiana, which also does not have a statewide
antidiscrimination law covering sexual orientation, passed a state RFRA that covered
private causes of action.38 Again there was a national outcry resulting in calls to
boycott the state, and the state legislature and governor quickly adopted an

31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). See generally Thomas C. Berg, What
Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39
VILL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the background and effect of RFRA); Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) (same); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas,
Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1994) (same).
32. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA as applied
to the states exceeds congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment). RFRA was
used successfully in a challenge to the application of Title VII to a religious university’s canon
law department. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455
(D.C. Cir. 1996). The court in that case, however, also rested its opinion on the First
Amendment. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (holding that the Religion Clauses created
a ministerial exception from antidiscrimination laws). The Court has held that RFRA continues to apply to federal laws. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,
546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006).
33. See W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 2:63, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2014) (collecting statutory references).
34. In his study of state court decisions under state RFRAs, Christopher Lund concluded
that the statutes had generally been interpreted very narrowly and on the whole were ineffective at granting religious believers exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. See
Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L.
REV. 466, 467 (2010).
35. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 76–77 (N.M. 2013).
36. See S. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (providing that a person could assert
the defense “regardless of whether the government is a party to the proceeding”); see also
Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 631–33 (2015) (providing additional information on the Arizona proposal).
37. See Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer Vetoes
Controversial Anti-Gay Bill, SB 1062, CNN (Feb. 26, 2014, 11:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill/index.html [https://perma.cc/U2YX-PVWU].
38. See Act of Mar. 26, 2015, Pub. L. No. 3-2015, § 1, 2015 Ind. Acts 6, 8.
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amendment exempting antidiscrimination laws from the coverage of the state’s
RFRA.39 Similar state-RFRA controversies have played out in other states. 40
Not surprisingly, these policy debates have spawned a law review literature on
both sides of the issue.41 Andrew Koppelman argues that antidiscrimination law is
primarily an exercise in social engineering, ensuring access to the market and changing social norms.42 He rejects the notion that discrimination is an individualized
harm, such as a classic tort, and favors religious accommodations because such accommodations do not threaten the structure of antidiscrimination laws. 43 Other scholars, in contrast, have argued that respect for the dignity of LGBT citizens requires
that there be no religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.44 Such exemptions, they argue, threaten the psychological well-being of gays and lesbians.45 On
the other side of the debate, Thomas Berg has noted the similarities between the
claims of religious conscience and the gay-rights critique of the closet.46 Both impulses arise from a desire to live authentically in the public sphere. Both reject the
notion that others may demand that core aspects of one’s identity—sexuality and
religion—be kept out of view in a private space.47 Berg accordingly argues in favor
of generous exemptions for religious objectors.48

39. See Act of Apr. 2, 2015, Pub. L. No. 4-2015, 2015 Ind. Acts 9; see also Koppelman,
supra note 36, at 635–36 (discussing the background to the law as amended).
40. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 631–38.
41. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims
Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206 (2010); Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and
Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS 123 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds.,
2008); Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination
Campaigns Against Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING
CONFLICTS, supra, at 103; Koppelman, supra note 36; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, SameSex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); Louise
Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015); Laura S. Underkuffler, Odious Discrimination and the
Religious Exemption Question, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2069 (2011).
42. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 620, 627.
43. See id. at 620.
44. See Melling, supra note 41, at 190 (“Anti-discrimination laws are fundamentally a
way of according recognition, of embracing and opening the doors to those traditionally excluded.”); Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2088 (“Laws that prohibit discrimination against
gay men and lesbian women, in all aspects of their lives, attempt to ‘foster[] . . . individual
dignity, . . . creat[e] . . . a climate and environment in which each individual can utilize his or
her potential . . . , and [ensure] equal protection’ of the laws.”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37 (D.C.
1987)).
45. See Melling, supra note 41, at 190–91 (“It takes only one such experience, sanctioned
by the law, to make an LGBT person think that the promise of equality is not real.”).
46. See Berg, supra note 41, at 218.
47. See id. at 207–08.
48. See id. at 208. Chai Feldblum also notes the affinity between the claims of religious
objectors—what she calls “belief liberty”—and arguments offered by gay-rights advocates but
concludes that in all but a few very limited cases, religious objectors should not be accommo-
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This debate extends beyond questions of church and market. Some of the actors
that might claim religious exemptions are nonprofit entities that are involved only
indirectly in commerce.49 Most of these cases, however, involve for-profit businesses. The argument has invoked the classical debates over church and state. In
making their arguments, however, scholars and others often reference the commercial status of the participants and the fact that they have chosen to operate in the
market. Consider Chai Feldblum, who writes:
Once an individual chooses to enter the stream of economic commerce
by opening a commercial establishment, I believe it is legitimate to require that they play by certain rules. If the government tolerated the private exclusionary policies of such individuals in the commercial sector,
such toleration would necessarily come at the cost of gay people’s sense
of belonging and safety in society. Just as we do not tolerate private racial
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the commercial arena,
even if such beliefs are based on religious views, we should similarly not
tolerate private beliefs about sexual orientation and gender identity that
adversely affect the ability of LGBT people to live in the world.50
Notice that for Feldblum’s position the commercial status of the religious objectors
is key to weakening their right to act in accordance with their religious beliefs. Likewise, she conceptualizes the market as a place where gay people are entitled to be
shielded from certain kinds of religious beliefs. Presumably, for example, she does
not believe that a similar legal entitlement should govern the noncommercial activities of churches. In short, her argument assumes an ideal relationship between religion and the market, a relationship that the law must define and police. 51 This only
partially articulated ideal does much of the normative work in her argument. Unfortunately, she does not fully articulate the theory of church and market that supports
her conclusions. Similar assumptions about the proper relationship of religion and

dated. See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 149–55. In contrast, Laura S. Underkuffler acknowledges the connection between identity and behavior with regard to sexual identity but not religion. See Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2082 (“Conduct may be a part of gay or lesbian
sexual orientation, but that conduct is simply an expression of who that person is.”).
49. See Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, OAL Dkt. No. CRT 6145-09
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law, Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.aclu-nj.org/files/8713/2639/9826
/CRT_6145-09_Bernstein_ID.pdf [https://perma.cc/A52H-S5AY] (involving an ocean-side
pavilion operated by a self-described ministry associated with the Methodist Church).
50. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 153 (footnote omitted).
51. Feldblum is certainly not alone in tying the legitimacy of denying religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws to the market context of religious actors. See, e.g., Mark
Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (but Wrongly) Decided,
35 CONN. L. REV. 129, 159–61 (2002) (arguing that commercial entities should not be able to
assert expressive association exemptions from antidiscrimination laws); Maureen E. Markey,
The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487,
543 (1998) (“Landlord/tenant-free exercise conflicts are different from the usual free exercise
claim for a number of reasons. These conflicts always involve a landlord who voluntarily engages in a regulated commercial activity, not for religious, but for profit-making purposes.”)
(emphasis in original).
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market are at work in the arguments of others. How this relationship might be explicitly conceptualized is the issue to which I turn in the next sections.
II. THE PUBLIC THEORY OF THE MARKET AND
THE PRIVATE THEORY OF THE MARKET
This Part presents two theories of the market and how commerce and religion
ought to be related to one another. It then applies each of these theories to the question of whether those with religious objections to same-sex marriage should be
granted exemptions from antidiscrimination laws when those laws require that they
assist with same-sex weddings. The first is what I label the public theory. It posits
that ideally markets ought to embody the values associated with liberal democracy
so that powerful market institutions should be treated as closely analogous to government institutions. This implies that religion is both entitled to special protection
within the market, and that its power should be limited. I label the second approach
the private theory of the market. This theory is substantively indifferent to the role
of religion in the market, so long as market outcomes result from contractual arrangements free of force and fraud.
A. The Public Theory of the Market
The public theory of the market takes the relationship between the state and citizens in a well-functioning liberal democracy as the model for structuring the market.
In the liberal tradition, the legitimacy of the state’s power rests on two conditions.
First, the state is accountable to citizens collectively for its actions. It is a government
“of the people, by the people, for the people.”52 Its actions are their actions, the expression of their collective will exercised after due deliberation. Second, the state is
to lavish equal respect and concern on its citizens. There is no privileged class nor is
there any caste of underlings. 53 All are equal before the law, and all laws are to be
framed so as to benefit the public good. In practice, of course, the benefits and burdens of laws will fall unequally, but when those burdens are systematically allocated
to groups based on immutable characteristics or basic aspects of individual identity
—race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion—then the law is presumptively illegitimate.54 Beyond the formal equality of the law, a well-functioning liberal democracy is supposed to provide social equality, or at the very least, a society in which
opportunity is open to all and none can claim special advantages based upon accidents of birth.

52. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, November 19, 1863, in
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (the text of the
Gettysburg Address).
53. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 87–88 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Aristocratic and caste
societies are unjust because they make these contingencies [of birth] the ascriptive basis for
belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes.”).
54. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (arguing
that courts should impose heightened scrutiny when laws unduly burden “discrete and insular
minorities”). See generally Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the
Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163 (2004).
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When the norms of democratic liberalism are taken as the benchmark of legitimacy, the unregulated market appears problematic. The shape of such a market is
emergent rather than deliberative. It is not the result of debate and democratic decisions. Furthermore, the ebb and flow of business within the market can leave some
actors with more power than other actors. On this view, employers are more powerful
than employees, businesses are more powerful than consumers, and corporations are
more powerful than individuals. These asymmetries of power are like the asymmetry
in liberal-political theory between the power of the state and the power of individuals.
Just as the asymmetry between government and citizen requires that the state be subject to limitations on its power and norms of equality, powerful economic actors
should be subject to regulations that impose similar public values on their activities. 55
Thus beginning in the Progressive Era and continuing through the New Deal to the
present, one of the central ambitions behind the construction of the modern regulatory state has been to make the market more liberal and more democratic in its operation, constraining the power of private and democratically unaccountable market
actors.
Religion occupies an ambivalent position in liberal-democratic theory and likewise has an ambivalent position in the public vision of the market. 56 On one hand,
liberal democracy is premised on the brute fact of moral and religious pluralism.
Public institutions should not embody any particular theological view nor should
they seek to impose on citizens a comprehensive moral or religious system. 57 Furthermore, religion can be seen as an irrational and potentially violent force, one that
must be constrained and kept away from the levers of state power. 58 Accordingly,

55. For example, critics of the law’s willingness to enforce boilerplate agreements have
long suggested that doing so undermines democracy, because large commercial actors are in
effect authoring laws without democratic accountability. See MARGARET JANE RADIN,
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–51 (2013);
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971).
56. For a good discussion of the problems of religion and modern philosophical discussions of liberalism, see generally ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR
REASON (2000).
57. Of course, this does not mean that the state must be entirely neutral with regard to
notions of the good. The prior demands of justice place constraints on visions of the good life
that citizens may pursue. As two political philosophers put it:
If some ways of life cannot survive in a society in which everybody has what
justice demands, and without perfectionist political action on their behalf, then
that is unfortunate for those who favour such ways of life but no reason for the
state to help them. Rather, they will have to revise their conception of the good
to fit the constraints imposed by the priority of the right.
STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS 31 (1992).
58. See AUDI, supra note 56, at 3–4 (“Religion can, however, be a divisive force in democratic politics. The impulse to pursue the Ultimate Good, particularly in an authoritative institutional context and with the support of others sharing the same religious outlook, can lead
to a tendency, conscious or unconscious, to dominate others. A holy cause can sanctify extreme measures.”); Koppelman, supra note 36, at 629 (“Resistance to religious accommodation has its source in the political left, much of which, largely as a consequence of disputes
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norms against the establishment of religion and theocracy place limits on the ability
of the state to enact laws with explicitly religious content.59 At the same time, religion
can be part of an individual’s core identity, an identity that the state should respect.
The state may not single out believers on the basis of their religion and in some cases
may need to limit the law’s reach in order to ensure that believers have the necessary
freedom to live their religion.60
For the public theory, the proper reach of antidiscrimination laws is open to a
vigorous debate. Arguing from broadly similar principles about how the market
should be structured, proponents of aggressive antidiscrimination laws and generous
religious exemptions reach very different conclusions. For proponents of antidiscrimination laws, the market is a public space in which all are entitled to equal
respect regardless of their race, religion, or sexual orientation. The evil of discrimination lies in the act of discrimination itself, independent of the question of how
pervasive the discrimination might be. Hence, the fact that there is no shortage of
bakers in Portland, Oregon, eager to provide wedding cakes for lesbian nuptials is
irrelevant. Analogously, the vast majority of government officials do not discriminate on the basis of race, but this fact would not immunize a single official that did
discriminate from the censure of the Equal Protection Clause. It is enough that the
government has failed its obligation to treat its citizens equally regardless of race. 61
Likewise, businesses occupy a position of greater power than their customers. As
powerful, public institutions, they must exercise that power consistent with fundamental liberal-democratic norms. The fact that the business is religiously motivated
is irrelevant. If anything, the religious motivation makes the conduct of Elane
Photography LLC or the Portland baker even more suspect. Just as the institutions of
the state may not be structured on explicitly religious grounds, so also businesses
cannot be left unfettered to pursue religious goals. 62 Religion is perhaps especially
prone to irrational or illiberal action. Hence, religiously motivated discrimination is
particularly dangerous because it threatens not only norms of equality but also a public space in which powerful institutions cannot exploit their power to advance sectarian interests or threaten a secular public order.
Religious objectors, however, can also deploy a public vision of the market in
favor of exemptions from antidiscrimination laws. In a public space, citizens are entitled to be treated with dignity by powerful actors. Religious believers cannot be

over sexual ethics, regards religion as a malign force in the world.”).
59. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding that government power may not be delegated to religious bodies).
60. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546–47 (1993) (holding that laws which single out conduct merely because it is religious must
satisfy strict scrutiny); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963) (holding that laws
incidentally burdening religious conduct were subject to constitutional scrutiny).
61. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
62. Justice Ginsburg, for example, has articulated a vision of the market in which businesses exist for purely secular purposes. “Religious organizations exist to foster the interests
of persons subscribing to the same religious faith. Not so of for-profit corporations.” Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2795 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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excluded from public life on the basis of religion. 63 A key aspect of dignity is the
ability to live and act authentically. 64 Crucially, this includes the ability to act consistently with one’s basic identity in public. We do not respect citizens when we insist
that their identity is acceptable only so long as it is kept private. Just as society does
not adequately respect the dignity of gay citizens if it requires that their sexuality
remain firmly locked in the closet, society is similarly disrespectful of religious believers when it requires that religious conduct be confined to the closet of private
spaces. Hence, antidiscrimination laws properly limit the ability of employers to punish employees who are “too religious” in public, as for example when a Muslim
woman is prohibited by her employer from wearing a hijab to work.65 Likewise, antidiscrimination laws threaten the dignity of religious believers who must abandon the
right to live authentically in accordance with their beliefs as a condition of pursuing
their chosen employment.66
The public theory of the market may thus be deployed in favor of both enforcement of and exemption from antidiscrimination laws. When the issue is joined in
these terms, both sides share the assumption that the market should be structured by
the law so as to instantiate the values of equal respect and concern that should apply
to public spaces. At best, the public theory is thus indeterminate. At worst, it is incoherent. It is possible, however, to conceptualize the market in ways that reject the
public theory’s basic assumptions.
B. The Private Theory of the Market
The private theory of the market rejects the idea that the norms of a liberal democracy should form a baseline for legitimate commercial behavior. 67 Rather, it
places primary emphasis on voluntary, private agreement. Indeed, voluntary agreement is seen as more normatively primal than the norms of liberal democracy. Thus,
the social contract tradition tries to legitimate liberal democracy by recourse to

63. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 627–29 (1978) (holding that states may not prohibit ministers from holding public office); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1961)
(holding that government office may not be conditioned on beliefs about God).
64. See Berg, supra note 41, at 215 (“[R]eligious freedom finds significant justification . . . in the importance of religious belief to personal identity.”).
65. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in
violation of the company’s dress code).
66. See Douglas Laycock, Afterword, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY:
EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra note 41, at 189, 201 (“The result would be to exclude from a
range of occupations and professions many believers who are unwilling to violate their faith
commitments. Such occupational exclusions have an odious history. The English Test Acts
and penal laws long excluded Catholics from a range of occupations . . . .”).
67. Richard Epstein has provided the clearest and most forceful critique of antidiscrimination laws on these grounds. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992); Richard A.
Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of
Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (2014).
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stories about (admittedly imaginary) private contracts rather than vice versa. 68 This
does not mean that the market should be thought of as an anarchic space, red in tooth
and claw. Law is necessary to provide an institutional structure in which economic
life can be ordered by voluntary agreements. 69 Tort and criminal law should prohibit
the use of force and fraud. Property law should provide clear rules about entitlements
to resources and how those entitlements may be transferred. Contract law should
foster trust and cooperation by enforcing executory obligations. Other forms of
regulation may be necessary to overcome difficulties created by externalities,
holdout situations, natural monopolies, and a host of other problems that inhibit the
ideal of orderly, voluntary cooperation. Depending on one’s views regarding the
scope of these problems, the private theory of the market can push in a markedly
libertarian direction, but it need not.70 If one concludes that the natural impediments
to a well-functioning, voluntary market are substantial, then one can justify a great
deal of regulation in the name of constituting the market as a space ordered by private
agreements.
The key difference between the private theory of the market and the public theory
of the market is not necessarily the overall level of regulation. Rather, it is that the
private view of the market rejects the assumption that in order to be legitimate, market institutions should replicate the norms applicable to the liberal-democratic state.
Importantly, the private theory of the market feels no sense of unease with the fact
that market processes are emergent rather than deliberative. Collective outcomes
needn’t be the result of democratic choice to be legitimate. Likewise, even significant
market actors needn’t be subject to norms of equal concern to be legitimate. Rather,
the legitimacy of market outcomes rests on the procedural question of whether they
are the result of choices uninfected by force, fraud, or diminished capacity. 71
Because this theory sees a well-functioning market as emerging from private
choices, it is likely to be skeptical of claims that the market necessarily leads to vast
asymmetries of power. For example, one needn’t assume that employers will always
have more power than employees. Rather, the distribution of power between employers and employees will depend on the background supply and demand in the labor
market, which is constantly shifting. Likewise, corporations are not more powerful

68. See Jean Hampton, Contract and Consent, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 379, 379 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993) (“The contractarian form of argument became popular in the seventeenth century, and its popularity continues to this day. Advocates of this approach tell us to resolve answers to moral and political
issues by asking what a group of rational persons could all agree to, or alternatively, what such
people would be unreasonable to reject.”).
69. See F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 220 (1960) (“The classical argument
for freedom in economic affairs rests on the tacit postulate that the rule of law should govern
policy in this as in all other spheres.”).
70. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205 (2014) (identifying this critique of antidiscrimination laws with libertarianism).
71. Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 147–82 (rev. ed. 2013) (offering
a historical theory of justice, under which society is judged not by the ultimate distribution of
resources but whether that distribution results from just acquisitions and transfers of
resources).
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than their individual customers so long as those relationships are purely contractual.
The customer may always take his or her trade elsewhere, and corporations spend
millions seeking to cater to the desires of consumers, not vice versa. Once-mighty
firms can be rapidly brought low by competition, and dominant market positions are
frequently upset by new tastes and technologies.72 To be sure, in any actual market
the competitive conditions that give employees and consumers the whip hand are
present to a greater or lesser extent. By and large, however, the private theory of the
market suggests that the solution to any asymmetries is to foster competition by
lowering barriers to entry and refusing to protect incumbent firms.
The private theory of the market suggests that religion in the market is unobjectionable so long as it is contractual. Religious commercial actors—like other
market participants—are entitled to have the state enforce their voluntary, private
arrangements.73 Crucially, however, norms of equality and public deliberation do not
apply to contractual activity. Hence, a firm should be free to discriminate against
customers or employees on the basis of religion so long as there is no force or fraud
involved in its decisions. No market actor has an obligation to contract with any other
market actor. This would apply both to those that might wish to disfavor an employee
or employer because of her religious identity, and to a religious employer or business
that wishes to pursue an illiberal course of action dictated by his religious conscience.
Likewise, there is no objection to major market actors, such as large corporations,
pursuing explicitly religious agendas so long as they do so through voluntary contracts.74 Crucially, however, other market actors should be free to refuse to contract
with religiously motivated or discriminatory businesses. 75 Religion, like any other

72. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed.
1950) (“The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process
of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new
one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.”) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
73. Cf. Helfand & Richman, supra note 5, at 773–75 (discussing legal challenges that
religious actors in the market face in getting their contracts enforced).
74. For example, the Islamic finance industry involves an excess of $1 trillion globally,
but has attracted very little controversy in large part because it overwhelmingly involves
purely contractual relationships among equally sophisticated parties such as banks, investors,
and bond-issuing entities. See Mohammed Aly Sergie, The Rise of Islamic Finance, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/economics/rise-islamic-finance
/p32305 [https://perma.cc/ZE3H-A3GP] (“Global Islamic financial assets have soared from
less than $600 billion in 2007 to more than $1.3 trillion in 2012, an expansion rooted in the
growing pool of financial assets in Muslim-majority countries driven by consumer demand for
products that comply with religious codes.”). See generally MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC
FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE (2006).
75. See Ed Payne, Indiana Pizzeria Finds Itself at the Center of ‘Religious Freedom’
Debate, CNN (Apr. 3, 2015, 9:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/living/indianareligious-freedom-pizza-feat [https://perma.cc/Z9ZM-U2VS] (recounting boycotts organized
against a pizzeria owner who stated that he would not cater a same-sex wedding). But see
Robby Soave, Boycotts Are Hypocritical, Discriminatory, and Bad for Social Change,
REASON.COM: HIT & RUN BLOG (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:01 PM), http://social.reason.com/blog/2015
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activity pursued in the market, must succeed or fail based on its ability to attract
customers and has no grounds for complaint if it is shunned or boycotted by others.
While the private theory of the market is hostile to antidiscrimination law in principle, it provides no particular reason for granting an exemption for religiously motivated conduct. Indeed, the private theory views the law’s concern with the substance of otherwise voluntary transactions as illegitimate. The content of agreements
should be left to the parties, and there is no reason for the law to inquire into the
content of transactions once it has determined that there is no force or fraud. To grant
a religious exemption from antidiscrimination laws would favor religiously motivated commerce precisely because it is religiously motivated. 76 Hence, a regime of
religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws suffers in part from the same
problem as the antidiscrimination laws themselves. It judges market choices based
on their substance rather than their voluntariness. Exemptions can only be justified
by the private theory of the market, if at all, because they represent a rollback of
antidiscrimination laws, but it is necessarily an ad hoc and arbitrary rollback of those
laws. There is nothing in the private theory of the market that suggests that religiously
motivated commerce is particularly deserving of protection. It is thus equally hostile
to a religion-protective version of the public theory under which the law should override private ordering to ensure that the market is a respectful space for religious
believers.77
III. DOUX COMMERCE AND THE REACH OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
Against the two theories articulated in the previous section, I offer what I label
the doux-commerce theory. Unlike the private theory, this approach rejects the idea
that market outcomes are legitimated purely by virtue of being voluntary and contractual. It shares with the public theory a concern for the role of markets in fostering
a peaceful and pluralistic society. However, in contrast to the public theory, the douxcommerce theory sees much of the value of markets as lying precisely in the fact that
they are not formally governed by the norms of liberal democracy. It thus responds
to weaknesses in both of the alternative approaches. The problem with the public

/03/27/boycotts-are-hypocritical-discriminatory [https://perma.cc/3KMT-2UTU] (offering a
libertarian critique of boycotts).
76. The broadest proposal for such an exemption was passed by the lower house of the
Kansas legislature, but the Kansas Senate declined to take it up. The law would have provided
a blanket exemption from antidiscrimination laws based on religious motivations:
[N]o individual or religious entity shall be required by any governmental entity
to do any of the following, if it would be contrary to the sincerely held religious
beliefs of the individual or religious entity regarding sex or gender: (a) Provide
any services . . . related to, or related to the celebration of, any marriage, domestic
partnership, civil union or similar arrangement . . . .
Koppelman, supra note 36, at 631 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. 2453, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Kan. 2014) (as amended by the House Committee)).
77. Cf. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2028, 2031 (2015) (presenting the question of whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act requires a retailer to accommodate a Muslim employee who wishes to wear a hijab in
violation of the company’s dress code).
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theory is that by insisting on constructing the market around thick norms of dignity,
equality, and respect, it misses the important work that markets perform in society
precisely when they are governed by far thinner norms of mutual cooperation. The
weakness of the private theory is that it ignores the important social and political
work that markets perform. When commerce is reduced to nothing more than the
pursuit of private interests, we lack the moral language to identify and articulate this
work. We are also blinded to the way that the market’s ability to perform this work
is contingent on the shape of market outcomes as opposed to the purely procedural
question of whether transactions are voluntary.
A. The Doux Commerce Theory of the Market
The doux commerce theory rejects the notion that markets should be structured to
reflect as much as possible the norms of liberal-democratic institutions. It also rejects
the private theory’s evaluation of markets purely in terms of the voluntary satisfaction of preferences. Rather, it sees commerce as a distinctive form of social activity,
one that is separate from politics but that serves important political functions. In
Montesquieu’s language, commerce tends to “gentle” manners.78
Commerce is valuable because it is prosocial. Markets foster cooperation between
strangers, train us to see the world from another’s point of view, and generate wealth,
which has an ameliorative effect on tribal strife and a host of other social evils.79
Markets can perform these functions precisely because they are not democratic or
deliberative institutions. Unlike collective democratic action, collective market activity requires unanimity.80 A citizen cannot easily defect from the decision of his
country to go to war or change the law. It is far easier for an employee, however, to
find a new employer or for a consumer to select a different provider. 81 Market participants must, therefore, be far more attuned to the desires of others than political

78. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 338 (“[I]t is almost general rule that everywhere
there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are
gentle mores.” (footnotes omitted)).
79. I have developed these themes at much greater length elsewhere. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
80. Of course, markets don’t require literal unanimity in society. Rather, they require unanimity among those directly involved in a collective project. This is not true of democratic
political decisions. The argument in the text relies only on the point that markets require relatively high levels of consensus.
81. Of course, an employee’s practical ability to defect will depend on his economic situation and the availability of alternatives. My claim is not that employees enjoy some kind of
unfettered freedom. Rather, I’m making the more modest, comparative point that defection
from the state is far, far more difficult. As David Hume put it:
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to
day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man,
by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though
he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish,
the moment he leaves her.
DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in POLITICAL ESSAYS 186, 193 (Knud Haakonssen
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1772).

2017]

LI MI TS OF A NTI DIS CRI MI NA TIO N LA W

711

activists. Such activists always contemplate dragooning objecting citizens into some
collective project. This is, by definition, what political victory entails in a democratic
society. My observation here is not meant as a libertarian criticism of democratic
government. Rather, I wish to emphasize the different set of skills required of successful commercial and political actors.
Markets impose a requirement of persuasion on commercial actors. 82 Businesses
must entice customers, and those seeking goods and services must understand potential suppliers. Potential employees must persuade employers that they should be
hired. And so on. To be sure, in modern markets many transactions are impersonal
and mass-produced. Even such transactions require knowledge of counterparties (a
fact attested to by the ubiquity of market-research firms), and even impersonal markets provide frequent opportunities for more personal interactions. In order to entice
counterparties into a bargain, commercial actors must enter imaginatively into the
position of the other party. This process fosters skills of mutual comprehension. At
the same time, market cooperation does not require intense levels of commitment
and moral agreement. While associating products with a certain diffuse moral
outlook has become a popular marketing ploy, the vast majority of market transactions do not rest on moral, political, or religious agreement. 83 This is good. Indeed,
part of the virtue of markets is that they are generally not ideologically fraught
spaces, and it is precisely this blasé attitude toward ethnic, religious, political, and
moral differences that makes them such powerful engines of peaceful cooperation in
a pluralistic society.84
In order for markets to act as incubators of prosocial attitudes and behaviors, they
must be structured in particular ways. Crucially, they must facilitate trade between
strangers and trade across boundaries of tribal identity, whether the tribes are constituted by ethnicity, religion, sexual identity, or political conviction. 85 They must be
largely voluntary and reasonably competitive. A market actor whose counterparties
have little choice but to deal has far less incentive to enter imaginatively into the
world of his customers, and, to that extent, commerce will do less to “gentle” his
manners.86 Likewise, doux commerce requires that markets be widely accessible.

82. The demandingness of the persuasion requirements imposed on market actors is, of
course, one of the reasons that democratic government is necessary. Certain kinds of very
valuable collective projects are simply impossible under the unanimity requirements of
commerce.
83. I might want to buy the world a Coke because I like the message of world peace, but
Coke and I needn’t have bonds of shared political convictions. Likewise, shopping at Whole
Foods may be a way of signaling my love of the earth, but customers and employees needn’t
share the same religion.
84. Voltaire provides the classic statement of this position, noting the way that those of
differing religious persuasions peacefully traded with one another on the Royal Exchange in
London. VOLTAIRE, Sixth Letter: On the Presbyterians, in PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS 19, 20
(John Leigh ed., Prudence L. Steiner trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 2007) (1733).
85. See OMAN, supra note 9, at 23–39 (arguing in part that “well-functioning markets
cross boundaries created by the communities that define one's basic identity.”).
86. A classic Saturday Night Live skit captures this point nicely. Aired in the 1970s before
the breakup of the telephone monopoly, it takes the form of a mock television ad and shows a
telephone company employee engaging in various acts of gratuitous mismanagement and laziness, much to the apparent consternation of phone users. The ad then ends with the tagline:
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Just as trade that is tightly concentrated within a single tribe is less prosocial than
trade across tribal boundaries, a market from which certain tribes are excluded is
significantly less valuable than a market to which all have access. At the same time,
they cannot be made to instantiate the norms of deep, moral recognition or equality
that characterize the public theory of market without eroding their value as a sphere
in which contestation over such deep political and moral concerns is muted.
The doux-commerce theory thus shares with the public theory a concern for the
role of markets in constituting public life and, in particular, a concern with the problem of managing conflict and cooperation in a pluralistic society. It rejects the private
theory’s assumption that once the market has been arranged so as to eliminate force
and fraud, whatever outcome is produced by the voluntary interactions of the market
participants is right. The value of markets is not purely procedural. Rather, markets
are valuable because in the aggregate they can deliver a set of goods that support a
pluralistic society. Imagine, for example, a world sharply divided into mutually hostile and suspicious tribal groups that refuse to trade with one another. So long as the
refusal to trade was voluntary and tribal solidarity was not the result of force and
fraud, the private theory of the market would offer no basis for criticizing such a
market. From the doux-commerce perspective, however, such a market would be a
failure, even if it was entirely the result of voluntary transactions. Markets are valuable in large part because they facilitate cooperation across such tribal boundaries,
cooperation that requires a certain blasé attitude toward trading with ideological
opponents.
The doux-commerce theory’s attitude toward religion in the market is largely contingent and empirical. Consider a business that is infused with a sense of religious
purpose or identity, such as a kosher butcher or a religious publishing house directed
towards a particular sectarian audience.87 Such firms will cater largely to a particular
tribe, and to that extent their commerce will provide less social lubricant in the face
of pluralism. However, they will also deal with large numbers of non-coreligionists.88 Even if the butcher sells his meat only to Jews, he may purchase animals for the slaughter from a gentile farmer. 89 Likewise, the religious publisher will
deal with a secular printer to produce its volumes. Pursuing religious goals through
the market is thus more prosocial than pursuing those religious goals through alternative methods that involve less cooperation across tribal lines. The church that hires
a printer not of its faith to produce volumes of scripture fosters ties across tribal
frontiers in a way that it does not when it produces the volumes itself. 90

“We don’t care. We don’t have to. We’re the Phone Company.” Saturday Night Live: Season
2, Episode 1 (NBC television broadcast Sept. 18, 1976), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=CHgUN_95UAw [https://perma.cc/KXA2-KEZM].
87. See Meese & Oman, supra note 6, at 278–80 (collecting examples of such firms).
88. For an overview of coreligionist commerce and its legal challenges, see generally
Helfand & Richman, supra note 5.
89. In reality, a small kosher butcher likely buys meat from a slaughterhouse that complies with the kashruth rules. A major purveyor of kosher products, such as Hebrew National,
however, would have extensive commercial ties, including with wholesale suppliers of animals for slaughter.
90. See, e.g., Wm. James Mortimer, The Coming Forth of the LDS Editions of Scripture,
LDS.ORG (Aug. 1983), https://www.lds.org/ensign/1983/08/the-coming-forth-of-the-lds-editions
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Problems may arise, however, in markets where religion dominates commerce.
Consider Voltaire’s classic statement of the doux-commerce thesis:
Go into the Royal Exchange in London, a building more respectable than
most courts; there you will find deputies from every nation assembled
simply to serve mankind. There, the Jew, the Mohammedan, and the
Christian negotiate with one another as if they were all of the same religion, and the only heretics are those who declare bankruptcy; there the
Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist, the Anglican accepts the word of the
Quaker. Leaving this peaceful and liberal assembly, some go to the synagogue, others go to drink . . . .91
In this vision, religion is not absent. Voltaire defines the market participants in terms
of their religion. The commerce in which they engage, however, is not defined in
terms of religion. Indeed, it is precisely because religion does not dominate commerce that the market provides an arena of peaceful cooperation despite religious
and moral pluralism.
Now consider a market in which religion dominates commerce. American history
provides an example of such a society in nineteenth-century Utah. In 1847, responding to years of persecution, the Mormons migrated en masse to the Great Basin. Motivated in part by a vision of a godly society and responding in part to the exigencies
of settlement in the arid West, the Mormon Church organized much of economic life
along religious lines, distributing land and water rights as well as sponsoring various
industrial projects.92 With the completion of the transcontinental railroad, church
leaders redoubled their efforts to maintain Mormon economic independence,
organizing boycotts of non-Mormon merchants, cartelizing Mormon-owned businesses, and actively discouraging the consumption of imported goods.93 Not surprisingly, the Mormon quest for autarky exacerbated conflict between Mormons and
non-Mormons, leading at times to violence and contributing to the fervor of the antipolygamy crusades of the 1880s, which ultimately resulted in the mass incarceration
of Latter-day Saints94 and the near destruction of the Mormon Church. 95 Tellingly,
in the end the Mormons relied on commercial relationships with non-Mormons—

-of-scripture?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/BB2D-XN8V] (recounting how the Mormon church
hired Cambridge University Press to prepare an edition of its scriptures and the friendships
and understanding that developed as a result).
91. VOLTAIRE, supra note 84, at 20 (footnote omitted).
92. The story of this religious economy is told in LEONARD J. ARRINGTON, FERAMORZ Y.
FOX & DEAN L. MAY, BUILDING THE CITY OF GOD: COMMUNITY AND COOPERATION AMONG
THE MORMONS 41–62 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed. 1992) (1976). See also LEONARD J.
ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE LATTER-DAY SAINTS
1830–1900, at 39–63 (1958).
93. See ARRINGTON, supra note 92, at 311–35.
94. “Latter-day Saint” is another name for Mormons, taken from the official name of the
Mormon Church, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
95. See Nathan B. Oman, Doux Commerce in the City of God: Trade and the Mormon
Ideal of Zion 7 (William & Mary Law Sch., Research Paper No. 09-289, 2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520499 [https://perma.cc/96KH-AT5Y] (discussing conflict generated by the Mormon policy of religious autarky).
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bankers and investors who had purchased bonds issued by the church—to mediate
an end to the conflict between themselves and the federal government. 96
The Mormon Zion did not exhibit the characteristics that Voltaire lauded in the
Royal Exchange. The doux-commerce theory requires a market in which religious
identity does not dominate commerce. This doesn’t mean that religious identity must
be abandoned, but trade must flow relatively freely across tribal frontiers. Religiously themed businesses and religiously motivated conduct—even conduct that restricts trade on the basis of religion—is unobjectionable but only so long as it does
not threaten to undermine commerce as a process mediating social pluralism. Ultimately, the market envisioned by the doux-commerce argument cannot be transformed into a godly space. This doesn’t mean that it needs to be a secular space,
affirmatively hostile to religion. Indeed, constructing the market in such terms is
likely to breed resentment and hostility of precisely the kind that commerce is supposed to ameliorate.97 The market, however, must be a pluralistic space, one to which
all have relatively open access and in which all can readily find willing trading partners beyond the tribes—religious, ethnic, political, moral, or sexual—that define
their deepest identities.
B. Doux Commerce and the Scope of Antidiscrimination Law
The doux-commerce argument suggests that the scope of both antidiscrimination
laws and religious exemptions from those laws should be empirically contingent.
While it is sensitive to the role of markets in constituting public life, it does not insist
that, to the extent possible, markets should conform to liberal-democratic norms. Indeed, an effort to comprehensively impose such norms on market actors would be
destructive, undermining much of the good that markets do. The doux-commerce
argument does, however, require that markets be open to all and that, to the extent
possible, a blasé attitude toward commerce be cultivated. It thus shares with the private theory of the market at least a strong presumption that freedom of contract
should order market activity. 98 However, where the private theory of the market sees
the value of freedom of contract precisely in the fact that it is voluntary, a realm in
which private individuals may pursue their private agendas through private

96. See EDWARD LEO LYMAN, POLITICAL DELIVERANCE: THE MORMON QUEST FOR UTAH
STATEHOOD 232–48 (1986) (recounting the role of friendly bondholders as intermediaries between church leaders and federal officials).
97. Louise Melling has argued that providing religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws will not serve to lessen social conflict around same-sex marriage. See
Melling, supra note 41, at 185–87. In support of her claim, she points out that conscience
exemptions guaranteeing that objecting medical professionals need not perform abortions have
not lessened the social conflict around abortion. Id. at 186. The obvious problem with this
argument is that it rests on an unobservable counterfactual. The social conflict around abortion
might have been even more intense but for such exemptions. Certainly, it isn’t difficult to
imagine that the abortion wars would be considerably more intense if objecting doctors were
required by law to perform abortions or give up the practice of medicine.
98. See OMAN, supra note 9, at 23–39 (arguing that freedom of contract supports a douxcommerce approach to markets); see also Oman, supra note 9, at 204–18 (arguing that contract
law ought to be organized so as to support markets).
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agreements, the doux-commerce theory values freedom of contract for three public
and social, rather than private and individualistic, reasons.
First, freedom of contract forces market participants to think very carefully about
the desires of potential counterparties. As Adam Smith observed, “It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but
from their regard to their own interest.”99 In pursuing their interests, however, the
butcher, brewer, and baker must imaginatively enter into our world and understand
our needs. This ability to see the world from another’s point of view is a key skill for
operating in a pluralistic society. Thus, research suggests, for example, that in premodern societies trust and cooperation increases as trade replaces subsistence agriculture as the basis of economic life. 100
Second, freedom of contract makes intertribal cooperation easier by lowering the
stakes of collective action. Political institutions are designed to allow collective action in the face of disagreement. Democratic deliberation creates a fictitious consent
to political decisions. Frequently, however, political decision making is an incubator
for suspicion and ideological extremism. 101 By raising the spectre of a hostile and
coercive order from which one cannot easily defect, politics tend to foster distrust
and conflict. In contrast, commercial interactions tend to be less fraught precisely
because market actors have less power over one another. It is thus easier for those
with opposing political, religious, or ethnic allegiances to cooperate as trading partners than as political partners because defection from such schemes is far easier than
defection from political decisions. Freedom of contract makes the market regime of
relative unanimity and easy defection possible, thereby fostering cooperation across
tribal lines that would not be possible in a world of purely democratic decision making. To the extent that we abandon freedom of contract as an ordering principle of
the market, we raise the ideological stakes of commerce, increasing conflict. This is,
in part, why the public theory of the market, with its allegiance to strong norms of
dignity and recognition at the expense of freedom of contract, is potentially so
destructive.
Finally, freedom of contract allows for a flexibility in economic arrangements that
historically has produced material prosperity on a scale unrivaled by any alternative
means of organizing economic life. 102 Material prosperity, in turn, tends to have an

99. SMITH, supra note 2, at 18.
100. See generally Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst
Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Richard McElreath, Michael Alvard, Abigail Barr, Jean Ensminger,
Natalie Smith Henrich, Kim Hill, Francisco Gil-White, Michael Gurven, Frank W. Marlowe,
John Q. Patton & David Tracer, “Economic Man” in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 795 (2005) (summarizing
experimental findings showing that when playing the so-called “Ultimatum Game” those
engaged in subsistence agriculture offered more one-sided distributions than those engaged in
trade, hunting, or other cooperative enterprises); Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel
Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS
& PROC. 73 (2001) (same).
101. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES: HOW LIKE MINDS UNITE AND
DIVIDE (2009).
102. This is also why even a “public theory” of the market will continue to allow the bulk
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ameliorative effect on a host of social evils from environmental degradation to the
mistreatment of ethnic and other minorities. 103 Economic prosperity even reduces the
number of people executed for witchcraft.104
Freedom of contract, however, is not the only concern that the doux-commerce
theory has in structuring the market. Freedom of contract is important because of the
kinds of social spaces and practices that it creates in the market, not because it reflects
some primal, libertarian right or represents the satisfaction of revealed preferences. 105
The focus of the doux-commerce theory is social rather than individualistic. We are
interested in markets as a set of social institutions and commerce as a social practice.
A market, no matter how staunchly it upholds freedom of contract, from which
groups are systematically excluded is for that reason a weaker and less valuable aspect of communal life. Markets are valuable because they foster cooperation in the
face of disagreement, inculcate habits of toleration, and generate prosperity and opportunity. They cannot do this if they are the preserve of a favored tribe or group.
Crucially, however, the doux-commerce argument’s concern with exclusion stems
not from a strong vision of what human dignity demands but rather from the more
modest ambition that commerce be maintained as a mechanism for managing pluralism and fostering peaceful cooperation.
Consider the position of African Americans prior to the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. In the wake of Emancipation, numerous southern state legislatures
passed “Black Codes,” which dramatically curtailed the power of freed slaves to contract, excluding them from large segments of the market and subjecting their participation to pervasive white control.106 Reconstruction Congresses moved against the

of economic activity to be organized by freedom of contract. History has taught that the alternative is mass impoverishment. There will, obviously, be massive disagreements about the
scope of freedom of contract that one must preserve to deliver acceptable levels of prosperity,
but today no one seriously questions that material abundance is impossible without leaving
the majority of economic activity to contract.
103. See generally BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (2005) (documenting the tight correlation between economic growth and diminished
social conflict, discrimination, and other social ills); Susmita Dasgupta, Benoit Laplante, Hua
Wang & David Wheeler, Confronting the Environmental Kuznets Curve, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2002, at 147 (discussing evidence that pollution and many forms of environmental
degradation decrease as societies become wealthier).
104. See generally Edward Miguel, Poverty and Witch Killing, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 1153
(2005) (showing a strong correlation between poverty and witch killing in Tanzania); Emily
Oster, Witchcraft, Weather and Economic Growth in Renaissance Italy, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 2004, at 215 (finding the same result for Renaissance Italy).
105. Compare CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 7 (2d ed. 2015) (arguing that contract law is required by the “liberal ideal” which
states that “morality requires we respect the person and property of others, leaving them free
to make their lives as we are left free to make ours”), with Oman, supra note 9, at 229–30
(“Given the benefits that flow from markets, we have good reason for creating bodies of law
that serve to sustain and strengthen markets. This is what contract law does.”).
106. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877,
at 199–200, 208–09 (1988). While the Reconstruction Congresses did move aggressively to
improve the plight of freed slaves, one shouldn’t overstate their commitment to racial equality.
They believed that African Americans were entitled to “political rights” and “civil rights,” but
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Black Codes, but after Reconstruction southern legislatures—aided and abetted by
the Supreme Court, which struck down much of the work of the Reconstruction
Congresses as unconstitutional107—created a Jim Crow regime of de jure segregation
in a host of areas such as public accommodations and transportation. Semigovernment-sanctioned violence further limited African American participation in
economic life. Finally, racist norms and beliefs supported and strengthened the regime. Libertarians and progressives argue over the extent to which Jim Crow resulted
from government action or the failure of private markets.108 From the perspective of
the doux-commerce thesis, however, the resolution of this debate is of limited interest. Rather, what is important is that the exclusion of the African Americans from
full participation in the market was undeniable and that the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
despite the fact that it did not ban discrimination in the market generally, massively
expanded the ability of African Americans to engage in peaceful and productive
commerce.
In the eyes of the doux-commerce theory, the evil of racial discrimination is systemic rather than individual. The refusal of any particular individual to contract with
another individual is a natural result of freedom of contract and should not be made
a legal wrong. The problem arises when discrimination is so systemic that its victims
are unable to fully participate in commerce. Antidiscrimination laws are justified as
a way of combating this systemic evil. The doux-commerce theory, however, does
not provide arguments that justify banning discrimination as a way of vindicating an
individual right to be free of public insults to one’s dignity. The goal of the douxcommerce approach is peaceful cooperation in a pluralistic society, not universal
bonds of fraternity or a deep mutual recognition. Consider a sign in a business declaring, “No blacks allowed.” If such signs are widespread and the sentiment that
they express widely acted upon, then they undermine the ability of the market to
deliver the benefits posited by the doux-commerce argument. On the other hand, if
such signs are extremely rare and mark the business owner that posts them as a crank
and a social pariah, then they do not threaten the beneficent possibilities of commerce
and the doux-commerce theory provides no justification for banning them.
One justification that the doux-commerce theory might offer for a more expansive, individualistic, rather than systemic, approach to antidiscrimination laws is that
such laws force market actors to trade across tribal and ideological boundaries. The
ability of markets to foster cooperation and social interaction across such boundaries
is one of their chief virtues. Aggressive antidiscrimination laws even in the absence
of systematic exclusion, one might argue, seem to enhance this activity. Despite its
initial plausibility, however, there are two reasons for rejecting this argument. The
first is that it does a poor job of justifying any of the antidiscrimination laws that we

not “social rights,” an elastic category that justified de jure segregation of various kinds. See
Bagenstos, supra note 70, at 1209–13 (briefly recounting this intellectual history and collecting sources).
107. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act
of 1875).
108. Compare EPSTEIN, supra note 67, at 126–27 (arguing that African American exclusion from the market resulted from government action), with Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets
Don’t Stop Discrimination, SOC. PHIL. POL’Y, April 1991, at 22 (arguing that unregulated
markets inevitably result in widespread discrimination).
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currently have. Those laws all have an asymmetrical structure.109 Employers may not
refuse to hire an employee because of the employee’s religion, but employees are
free to refuse to work for an employer because of the employer’s religion. 110 Businesses, likewise, are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race, religion,
gender, or sexual orientation, but customers are free to discriminate on that basis. 111
If the goal of antidiscrimination laws was simply to force individuals to trade across
tribal boundaries, this asymmetry makes little sense.
The second problem with this argument is that other aspects of the douxcommerce approach are undermined when the refusal to contract is made into a legal
wrong. The mutual understanding promoted by markets comes from more than the
brute proximity promoted by commerce. Rather, trade requires market actors to consider the desires and goals of their counterparties. This imaginative ability to see the
world from another’s point of view is one of the reasons that commerce tends to have
a corrosive effect on established social hierarchies. In a nation of shopkeepers no one
can afford the haughtiness of an aristocrat who need not consider the goals of another.
Likewise, seeing the world from another’s point of view lubricates interactions in a
pluralistic society. Indeed it is an intellectual prerequisite for complying with most
liberal conceptions of justice. 112 Allowing a party, however, to demand as a legal
right that another contract with him undermines this process.113 The holder of such a
legal entitlement need not see the world from his counterparty’s point of view. It is

109. But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.5(a) (West 2007) (stating that “[n]o business establishment of any kind whatsoever shall discriminate against, boycott or blacklist, or refuse to buy
from, contract with, sell to, or trade with any person in this state on account of any [protected]
characteristics”).
110. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer—to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . . . .”).
111. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”); but see CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 51.5(a) (prohibiting discrimination in purchasing by “business establishments”). Note,
federal law does not prohibit discrimination in public accommodations on the grounds of
gender, although California does.
112. See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM 74–83
(1999) (arguing that, for example, John Locke’s theory of justice requires certain dispositions
of understanding others); OMAN, supra note 9, at 40–66 (discussing how markets foster mutual
understanding).
113. The system of Spanish trade in colonial Latin America provides an extreme example.
Under the repartimeiento de mercancias, conquered Incas were forced to purchase goods from
Spanish merchants at prices set by the conquerors. See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A.
ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 16–19
(2012) (discussing Spanish economic practices in the conquered Inca Empire). Such an arrangement provided little incentive for the Spanish merchants to understand their Inca “customer,” nor did it make much sense for Incas to invest in learning about alternative suppliers
to the Spanish “traders.” See id.
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enough to invoke the fear of the courts. This is not a reason per se for rejecting antidiscrimination laws, but it does suggest that such laws should not be justified on the
basis of forcing individual market interactions. Such forced interactions lack the capacity to “gentle manners” in Montesquieu’s phrase.
Applying this framework to antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation
suggests that the value of such laws is empirically contingent. Gays and lesbians have
undoubtedly been subject to violence and discrimination. 114 In some places, being
out may significantly limit one’s access to the market. In such places commerce cannot function successfully in the way posited by the doux-commerce theory without
legal intervention to ensure widespread access to goods and services in the market.
However, in other places being a gay or lesbian does not represent a barrier to full
participation in the market. This does not mean that the market in such places is free
of all acts of discrimination. Rather, it means that in such places discrimination is
rare and does not represent a threat to meaningful participation in commercial life.
In such places, the case for antidiscrimination laws is quite weak. At best they serve
a prophylactic function, ensuring that shifts in social norms don’t result in threats to
market access. Their ability to fulfill this role, however, is undermined by the fact
that the passage of antidiscrimination laws covering sexual orientation is generally a
result of shifting social attitudes rather than a cause of those shifts.
There are countervailing reasons that counsel in favor of granting religious
exemptions, where antidiscrimination laws are adopted. Aggressively enforcing antidiscrimination norms in the absence of threats to meaningful access can undermine
the pluralism-managing force of markets. In such cases, antidiscrimination norms
insist on a kind of normative recognition in the teeth of religious objections and then
deploy the power of the state against objectors to extract that recognition. Such a
course of action is more likely to exacerbate conflict rather than ameliorate it. Stated
simply, society is not well served when markets become sites of religious martyrdom.
Ideally, the market should resemble the idealized Royal Exchange of Voltaire not the
Circus Maximus of Nero. To LGBT-rights activists, any suggestion that religious
business owners are being persecuted for complying with antidiscrimination laws is
ridiculous. Such laws, they insist, are not designed to punish believers but to vindicate the rights of gay citizens. This response, however, misses the point. Within religious communities, those who face legal sanctions rather than engaging in conduct
that they regard as sinful will be lionized as heroes and martyrs regardless of what
gay-rights advocates say. History suggests that religious conduct that is legally sanctioned becomes more, rather than less, religiously salient.115 When the market
becomes the site where religiously motivated conduct is punished, commerce is

114. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 58–83 (1999) (documenting violence and discrimination against gays and lesbians).
115. Examples could be endlessly multiplied. Think of the Old Believers and Orthodox
believers in Russia who stubbornly clung to their beards. See ROBERT K. MASSIE, PETER THE
GREAT: HIS LIFE AND WORLD 234–36 (1980) (recounting Peter the Great’s attempt to force
Russians to shave their beards). Contemporary French efforts to ban students from publically
wearing the hijab provide another example. See, e.g., Angelique Chrisafis, French PM Calls
for Ban on Islamic Headscarves at Universities, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:23 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/13/french-pm-ban-islamic-headscarves-universities
-manuel-valls [https://perma.cc/Y2SD-DZHQ].
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transformed into another front in the culture wars rather than a mechanism for
managing pluralism. This doesn’t mean that the claims of religious believers should
always triumph. As noted above, widespread access to the market must trump other
concerns. Nevertheless, the doux-commerce theory provides reasons why religious
exemptions are valuable if they do not threaten others’ ability to participate meaningfully in commerce.
As an empirical matter, how common is discrimination by businesses against gay
and lesbian customers? Sizeable majorities of Americans believe that gays and lesbians face significant levels of discrimination. 116 The research on discrimination
based on sexual orientation, however, has overwhelmingly focused on employment
and workplace discrimination.117 There has been surprisingly little research on the
scope of discrimination by businesses against gay or lesbian customers. In her booklength treatment of the economic lives of gays and lesbians, for example, M.V. Lee
Badgett discusses discrimination against gay customers only briefly in passing, and
in outlining legislative proposals to increase the economic well-being of gays and
lesbians, she does not mention antidiscrimination laws targeting businesses’ interactions with customers.118 To be sure, there is some evidence of such discrimination.
In the past, governments have targeted businesses that catered to gays and lesbians.119
Such legal impediments, however, have largely disappeared.120 Two “tester” studies
attempted to show the extent of discrimination against gay customers. One study
found no cases in which a business refused services to gay customers, although store
attendants were slightly slower in approaching same-sex couples.121 The other study,
this time of hotels, found that overtly gay customers were refused accommodations
at somewhat higher rates than heterosexual couples, although the size of the

116. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC SEES RELIGION'S INFLUENCE WANING 16 (2014),
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2014/09/Religion-Politics-09-24-PDF-for-web.pdf [https://perma
.cc/R4KB-9DGT] (“About two-thirds of Americans think gays and lesbians face a lot of
discrimination in the U.S. today (65%) . . . .”).
117. See S. REP. NO. 113-105 (2013), https://www.congress.gov/113/crpt/srpt105
/CRPT-113srpt105.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY4M-Q53Z] (summarizing research on employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in response to the Employment NonDiscrimination Act of 2013); M. V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE
ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 20–51 (2001) (discussing the effects of
employment discrimination on LGBT incomes).
118. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 125 (discussing discrimination against gay
customers).
119. See id. at 106 (“Until the 1960s, the expansion of these public sites of gay consumption and identity formation was limited by police harassment, practices of extortion, laws
against homosexual sodomy, and pressure from liquor control boards.”).
120. See, e.g., One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
235 A.2d 12, 13 (N.J. 1967) (holding that the state liquor licensing authorities could not discipline gay bars because they permitted “apparent homosexuals to congregate”); see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down as unconstitutional a law that
the Court deemed to be motivated by antigay animus).
121. See Andrew S. Walters & Maria-Cristina Curran, ‘Excuse Me, Sir? May I Help You
and Your Boyfriend?’: Salespersons’ Differential Treatment of Homosexual and Straight
Customers, 31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 135.
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differential was unclear.122 The Pew Forum’s 2013 survey of LGBT Americans
reported that twenty-three percent of respondents had “[r]eceived poor service in a
restaurant, hotel, place of business” because of their sexual identity. 123 The study,
however, did not ask respondents whether they had ever been refused service.
It is difficult to know what to make of the empirical evidence. The lack of research
on discrimination by businesses is likely the result of a kind of intellectual triage by
scholars interested in LGBT rights, focusing on employment because that is the area
with the greatest impact on the economic well-being of gays and lesbians.124 Likewise, gays and lesbians may be able to avoid situations where they are refused service
by cloaking their sexual identity or consciously avoiding businesses that discriminate.125 The fact remains, however, that there is no evidence of widespread denials
of service to gay customers. Unlike African Americans in 1963, gays and lesbians
do not seem to operate in a market where they face ubiquitous refusals by a large
segment of businesses to serve them. There is evidence that discrimination in fields
such as housing and employment have serious, negative consequences on the material well-being of gays and lesbians.126 Likewise, there is evidence of subtle forms of
discrimination against gay customers, but not of the sort that antidiscrimination laws
can effectively remedy.127 Making rude service into a legal wrong is a fruitless enterprise. On the other hand slurs, verbal attacks, or threats can be more effectively
addressed through the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress or the criminal law, if the threats rise to the level of assault. 128
Of course, it is unreasonable to demand that all laws be justified by
comprehensive, empirical studies with statistically significant results. Often,
lawmakers, of necessity, act based on anecdotes and less rigorous social observation.

122. See David A. Jones, Discrimination Against Same-Sex Couples in Hotel Reservation
Policies, 31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 153, 155–57 (1996). The study involved
contacting hotels via letter and soliciting a response via a self-addressed stamped envelope.
The difficulty comes in how to interpret the many hotels that never responded to the query.
The authors coded all of these responses as rejections, although some of them may have simply
been hotels uninterested in the hassle of corresponding with potential customers. Id. at 158.
123. PEW RESEARCH CTR., A SURVEY OF LGBT AMERICANS: ATTITUDES, EXPERIENCES AND
VALUES IN CHANGING TIMES 41 (2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT
_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/EY4B-DAMF].
124. The popular stereotype of gays and lesbians as affluent is complicated by fuller economic data. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 117–21. Lee Badgett attributes this difference to
employment discrimination. See id. at 46–47. More recent data shows that while gay or lesbian
individuals earn less on average than the population as a whole, gay couples earn more than
heterosexual couples. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 27 (“Same-sex couples
bring in an average of $107,000 a year, compared with $96,000 for opposite-sex married
couples and $65,000 for opposite-sex unmarried couples [in 2011].”).
125. I am grateful to Lee Badgett for pointing out this possibility to me in an email
exchange.
126. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 20–50.
127. See generally Walters & Curran, supra note 121 (finding that store employees delayed
approaching apparently gay or lesbian customers).
128. Cf. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets,
and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (arguing in favor of a tort cause
of action for extreme and insulting racist speech directed at individuals).
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Given the historical animus against gays and lesbians, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that laws outlawing discrimination by businesses against gay and lesbian
customers would enhance their participation in commerce. My point, however, is that
we should be careful about overstating the necessity for such laws. Indeed, while
there are very few studies finding discrimination by businesses against gay or lesbian
customers, there is an extensive marketing literature on how businesses can reach out
to such customers.129 Much of this work is based on inaccurate hype generated by
marketing firms about the purchasing power of gay or lesbian consumers, but it does
suggest that, by and large, businesses are mainly interested in getting gay dollars
rather than refusing gay customers. 130 Even if one believes that it is implausible that
market competition will eliminate discrimination against gay employees, the
available evidence suggests that markets have done a fairly good job of eliminating
denials of service to gay and lesbian customers.131
The second empirical question is the likelihood that large numbers of religious
believers would avail themselves of a religious exemption from antidiscrimination
laws to avoid participating in same-sex weddings. Currently, there is no evidence of
frequent denials of services by wedding-industry professionals to same-sex couples.
One hundred and thirty-two thousand same-sex couples identified themselves as
married in the 2010 Census. 132 Of the tens of thousands of same-sex weddings that
have occurred in the United States as of 2016, only a handful seem to have run into
business owners with a religious objection to participating commercially in the nuptial festivities and sued them.133 The current evidence suggests that even among those
with religious objections to same-sex marriage, very few people would deny services
associated with same-sex weddings. Thirty-nine percent of Americans opposed
same-sex marriage before Obergefell,134 and “[o]ne of the strongest factors underlying views of same-sex marriage is religion, and the sense that homosexuality is in
conflict with one’s religious beliefs.” 135 Given the widespread religious opposition

129. See generally Lisa Peñaloza, We’re Here, We’re Queer, and We’re Going Shopping!
A Critical Perspective on the Accommodation of Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Marketplace,
31 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, nos. 1/2, 1996, at 9 (providing a critical summary of this literature).
130. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 102–32 (providing a comprehensive critique of the
myth of the affluent gay consumer).
131. Compare Sunstein, supra note 108 (arguing that markets will not eliminate employment discrimination), with BADGETT, supra note 117, at 38–45 (arguing that market competition will eliminate employment discrimination only slowly).
132. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 25. In 2010, there were fewer than 50,000
legally recognized same-sex marriages performed in the United States. See id. at 25 n.6. The
self-reported number, however, is a better indicator of the social—as opposed to the legal
—salience of same-sex marriage. Also, because the wedding industry is involved with
weddings regardless of whether they are legally recognized, the self-reported number is a
better indicator of the potential scope of conflicts. The commitment ceremony at issue in the
Elane Photography case, for example, arose before New Mexico recognized same-sex
marriage.
133. See Koppelman, supra note 36, at 643.
134. PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AT RECORD HIGH, BUT KEY
SEGMENTS REMAIN OPPOSED 1 (2015), http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/06/6-8-15
-Same-sex-marriage-release1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YY3C-ZKNL].
135. Id. at 3.
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to same-sex marriage, we would expect there to be ubiquitous denials of service to
gay couples if such beliefs were regularly translated into discriminatory commercial
conduct. Such is not the case.
Same-sex marriage is in its infancy, however. In all likelihood, the norms among
the minority of religious believers that object to same-sex marriage are in the process
of coalescing. Hence, it is possible that a strong norm of refusing to provide services
to gay couples could develop among conservative religious wedding professionals.
No such norm currently seems to exist, but one might object to granting religious
exemptions from antidiscrimination laws on the ground that the law must nip such a
norm in the bud before it can take root among conservative religious believers. 136
This is a valid concern to the extent that such a norm might result in significant problems of access to wedding-related services in regions dominated by conservative religious believers.
Nevertheless, there are three reasons to be skeptical of this argument. First, legally
punishing religiously motivated conduct is likely to make it more, rather than less,
salient for religious believers, as it plays into well-established narratives of religious
persecution by the state.137 This suggests that punishing religious behavior is likely
to be counterproductive from the point of view of weakening religious norms around
that behavior. Second, even were such a norm to become entrenched, religious exemptions would still not threaten meaningful access to services in areas with relatively few conservative religious believers. Third, there is reason to believe that such
a norm is not currently taking root in conservative religious communities. One

136. Professor Frederick Mark Gedicks has made this argument. See Koppelman, supra
note 36, at 644 (recounting Gedicks’s argument).
137. But see Melling, supra note 41, at 191–92 (arguing that granting exemptions will slow
the pace of social change). One might counter the claim that legally sanctioning religiously
motivated conduct will tend to entrench that conduct’s religious salience by pointing to the
example of Bob Jones University, which has formally renounced its prohibition against interracial dating despite fighting the loss of its tax-exempt status over this prohibition to the
Supreme Court. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983). However, it
is by no means clear that the loss of tax-exempt status hastened the change in Bob Jones
University’s policy, which did not happen until 2000, three decades after the IRS initially
moved against it. Having ideologically invested so much in the issue during the battles with
the IRS, it is equally likely that government action slowed change at Bob Jones University.
One might also believe that conservative religious groups will abandon their moral
objections to homosexuality and same-sex marriage if they are not coddled with religious
exemptions. Several religious traditions have, in fact, altered their teachings on sexual morality
to accommodate shifting attitudes toward homosexuality and other sexual behavior. These
groups, however, were not responding to antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore, religious
norms around sexuality may prove particularly hardy. We are now two generations removed
from the Sexual Revolution’s initial attacks on notions of chastity, which links licit sexual
activity to heterosexual marriage, yet chastity remains an important moral ideal for many
conservative religious believers. Sexual orientation presents a different set of challenges to
this ethic, but it would be a mistake to suppose that conservative religious sexual moralities
are epiphenomenal teachings that will be rapidly discarded. Continued opposition by some
religious believers to the sundering of the link between marriage and licit sexual activity
suggests that these teachings are considerably more durable than the flimsy racist theologies
that have been almost universally abandoned over the same period.
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researcher, for example, was unable to locate any hotels or bed-and-breakfasts that
refused to provide services for a same-sex wedding in the very religiously conservative region of southern Utah.138 Slightly less than half of Americans support allowing
those with religious objections to refuse to provide services to a same-sex wedding,
but it appears that only a tiny fraction of Americans actually have any interest in
denying services themselves.139
Finally, we have reason to believe that there is regional variation both in the need
for antidiscrimination laws and the way that religious exemptions might interact with
those laws in practice. Given the paucity of data on discrimination by businesses
against gay or lesbian customers, it is impossible to accurately quantify the regional
likelihood of discrimination. The Pew Research Center’s study of the experience of
LGBT Americans found that respondents in the South were roughly 50% more likely
to report discrimination of any kind than respondents in the Northeast or Midwest. 140
Likewise, we know that religious opposition to same-sex marriage is not distributed
evenly across the country.141 The irony is that religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws are least likely to be adopted in those jurisdictions where they
pose the least threat, and antidiscrimination laws are least likely to be adopted in
those regions where they would be needed most. As a practical matter, however,
crafting limited religious exemptions from antidiscrimination statutes is probably the

138. See Chapman, supra note 19, at 1821–22. It must be emphasized, however, that
Chapman’s study made no attempt at systematic rigor and at best is a striking anecdote.
139. See Michael Lipka, Americans Split over whether Businesses Must Serve Same-Sex
Couples, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/30
/businesses-serving-same-sex-couples/ [https://perma.cc/B87D-NP9X] (noting that 47% of
Americans would allow the business to refuse services and 49% would require the business to
provide services). Rassmussen Reports ran a poll based on the Elane Photography facts in
2013, 2014, and 2015 asking if the photographer has the right to turn down the job and reports
85%, 73%, and 70% respectively of respondents in the three years favored the photographer.
See Do You Want a Religious Freedom Law in Your State, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/march_2015/do_you
_want_a_religious_freedom_law_in_your_state [https://perma.cc/K7UQ-CZT8]. It is possible that the respondents thought they were being asked the current state of the law rather than
for their own opinion, although Rassmussen also reports that 19% of respondents in 2015
“believe the Christian photographer should not have the right to turn down a same-sex wedding job, while 12% are not sure.” Id.
140. The Pew report stated:
LGBT adults living in the South are more likely than those living in the Northeast
and Midwest to have experienced four or more of these incidents—29% vs. 18%
for the Northeast and 19% for the Midwest. LGBT adults living in the West are
not statistically different from any of the three regional groups in this regard
(22% say they’ve experienced four or more of these incidents).
PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 123, at 43. The “incidents” referred to consist of having ever
“[b]een subject to slurs or jokes”; “[b]een rejected by a friend or family member”; “[b]een
threatened or physically attacked”; “[b]een made to feel unwelcome at a place of worship”;
“[r]eceived poor service in a restaurants, hotel, place of business”; and “[b]een treated unfairly
by an employer” because of sexual orientation. See id. at 41. The survey did not ask about
refusals of service.
141. See Chapman, supra note 19, at 1795–1801 (providing a detailed breakdown of religious and political attitudes towards same-sex marriage and homosexuality by state).
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most likely route toward getting them adopted in regions where they may be
needed.142
This analysis suggests that the proper balance between antidiscrimination laws
and religious exemptions will vary from community to community and from market
to market.143 In places where there is widespread hostility to gays and lesbians, pervasive discrimination against gay customers may pose significant limits on the ability
of gay citizens to participate in commercial life, although it is difficult to find evidence of such markets. Such a market will have less ability to “gentle” manners, and
its ability to facilitate peaceful cooperation will be significantly limited. In such
places, there is a more compelling case for antidiscrimination laws. Furthermore,
religious exemptions from those laws must be narrowly cabined if we are to maintain
meaningful access to the market in areas where such exemptions would be routinely
invoked. These are also communities where market forces are least likely to guarantee meaningful access. If a significant portion of the population consists of religious
believers that will invoke such exemptions, then they may need to be eliminated in
their entirety. If, on the other hand, hostility to gay and lesbian customers by businesses is rare in the markets, then the case for antidiscrimination laws weakens considerably. Likewise, in those markets, the case for religious exemptions is stronger.
Such exemptions will be invoked infrequently, and their existence will not meaningfully threaten access to the market. Furthermore, these are also the situations in which
market pressure is most likely to be effective in limiting religiously motivated
discrimination.
C. Objections and Responses
Such a framework will necessarily result in laws whose coverage varies and will
require lawmakers—whether legislative, administrative, or judicial—to make ad hoc
decisions based on local circumstances. One might object that such an approach faces
three difficulties: First, we lack clear criteria as to what constitutes “meaningful access” and when that access is threatened. Second, antidiscrimination laws cannot create meaningful changes in the market if their coverage isn’t complete. Third, such an
approach fails to properly respect the dignity of either the victims of discrimination
or conscientious objectors to antidiscrimination laws, whose sincerely held religious
beliefs are violated.
While I cannot claim to have an algorithm that specifies when discrimination

142. The Utah experience is instructive here. Despite having an extremely conservative
and religious population, the state legislature adopted an antidiscrimination law creating employment and housing protections for gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexuals. The law
passed with the very active support of the Mormon Church. Exempting religious organizations
from the law’s reach was key to creating the coalition in favor of its passage. See Laurie
Goodstein, Utah Passes Antidiscrimination Bill Backed by Mormon Leaders, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/12/us/politics/utah-passes-antidiscrimination
-bill-backed-by-mormon-leaders.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/D3CJ-CBYS]. Of course, the
law does not deal with discrimination against customers, so it does not directly implicate the
questions addressed in this article, but it does suggest a political dynamic that could result in
greater legal protections for LGBT citizens.
143. See Laycock, supra note 66, at 197–201.
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poses a threat to meaningful participation in the market, analogies to antitrust law
can at least guide our judgments in this situation. Of course, because the goals of
antitrust law center mainly on market efficiency, the analogy to the doux-commerce
argument is imperfect, but it does provide a useful starting place. Federal antitrust
law prohibits firms with market power from abusing that power. It thus requires both
a definition of the market and a test for determining when a firm has market power.
To massively oversimplify, antitrust law defines the given market for a firm as consisting of those firms that can readily supply substitutes for the firm’s goods and
services.144 Market power, in turn, is defined as “the ability to raise prices by restricting output.”145 These concepts can be applied in a very rough way to debates over
the proper scope of antidiscrimination laws.
When asking if discrimination poses a threat to meaningful access, we define the
market as the sphere in which those similarly situated to the targets of discrimination
normally shop. Of course, by assuming ever greater investment in searching for alternative providers, the definition of the market can be expanded, and as the Supreme
Court has acknowledged in the antitrust context, the precise contours of any given
market are fuzzy.146 Using the behavior of similarly situated consumers not subject
to discrimination, however, provides a baseline. In defining the market, it would be
a mistake to impose on targets of discrimination heroic search requirements that we
do not assume other market participants are shouldering. Evidence that discrimination has an effect on prices faced by gays and lesbians would provide powerful evidence in support of the claim that discrimination threatens meaningful access. 147 Discrimination could also be said to threaten meaningful access when it imposes on gays
and lesbians materially higher search costs than similarly situated participants in the
market. Minor or de minimis additional costs do not threaten meaningful access.
Concluding otherwise implies that every instance of discrimination, no matter how
isolated or rare, threatens meaningful participation. On the other hand, demanding
that additional search costs be substantial would create an unnecessarily heavy presumption against antidiscrimination laws. 148 Hence, while the doux-commerce

144. See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST
LAW § 5.02a (2002) (“Thus, a market is the arena within which significant substitution in
consumption or production occurs.”).
145. Id. at § 5.01.
146. See United States v. Conn. Nat’l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 667 (1974) (expressing some
doubt as to the precise scope of the market in relationship to a proposed merger); United States
v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 n.36 (1963) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 340–41 (1962) (same); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
330–32 (1961) (expressing some doubt as to the precise scope of the market in the case of a
contract challenged under the Clayton Act).
147. This is the approach taken in demonstrating the existence of substantial discrimination
against gays and lesbians in the employment context. There, the guiding assumption is that
wage differentials faced by gays and lesbians after controlling for other factors are evidence
of discrimination. See BADGETT, supra note 117, at 45–47 (discussing the research on employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
148. It is important to note that search costs and prices are in some sense substitutes for
one another in this argument. Price differentials could be evidence of discrimination in the
absence of increased search costs and vice versa.
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argument has a strong presumption in favor of freedom of contract, it does not place
unduly high hurdles in the way of justifying antidiscrimination laws.
Proponents of a public theory might argue that just as any discrimination by the
government among its citizens based on race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation is impermissible, any discrimination by market actors is also unacceptable. While there is an appealing conceptual purity to such a position, it would
represent a radical departure from how antidiscrimination laws have typically been
applied. First, those laws have always left huge classes of market actors unaffected.
Most dramatically, employees and customers have never been subject to such laws.
The racist who refuses to work for a black employer commits no legal wrong. The
same is true if he refuses to patronize an African American–owned business. Likewise, Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act does not apply generally to all businesses.149 More subtly, determining the proper level of sanctions for violations of
antidiscrimination laws always involves judgments about the acceptable level of discrimination. The central insight of Gary Becker’s pioneering work on the economics
of punishment is that, in setting sanctions, we are always making a judgment as to
the acceptable level of some evil.150 Insisting on “meaningful access” to the market
is not an algorithm but a rule of thumb, one that focuses our attention on the proper
concern. Calls to eradicate all discrimination have an algorithmic character, but in
light of experience and the limitations of the law as a system of social control, they
cannot be taken seriously.
Experience under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and antidiscrimination laws belies
the claim that gaps in the coverage of such laws renders them ineffective. Without
denying or belittling the barriers to opportunity faced by African Americans, the
1964 Civil Rights Act has been incredibly successful in dismantling the system of
segregated businesses and wholesale exclusion from much of economic life that
characterized Jim Crow.151 Yet the scope of the 1964 Act was limited. Most tellingly,

149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) (“Each of the following establishments . . . is a place
of public accommodation . . . any inn, hotel, motel . . . ; any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom,
lunch counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises . . . ; any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium
or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered . . . and which holds itself
out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.”).
150. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in
ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M.
Landes eds., 1974).
151. See James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment
Discrimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276, 281 (1990)
(documenting the large jump in average wages for African Americans associated with the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act). In historical terms, the system of formally segregated
businesses in the South and elsewhere in the country collapsed so rapidly that Title II of the
1964 Civil Rights Act garners very little scholarly or political attention today. See Lincoln L.
Davies, Lessons for an Endangered Movement: What a Historical Juxtaposition of the Legal
Response to Civil Rights and Environmentalism Has To Teach Environmentalists Today, 31
ENVTL. L. 229, 305 (2001) (“Partially because the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s ban on segregation
in public accommodations achieved success so quickly, the Act’s most powerful provision
today is Title VII . . . .”).
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it did not ban discrimination against customers on the basis of race in all businesses
but only in hotels, restaurants, and places of public entertainment. The Supreme
Court did hold in 1975 that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which states that “[a]ll persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right . . . to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens,”152 prohibits racial discrimination in private contracting,153 but that law does not reach discrimination based on
religion, gender, or national origin.154 The single greatest testament to the success of
these laws, despite gaps in their coverage, is that there is no organized effort to expand Title II to cover all businesses. The issue has essentially no political salience
today. Indeed, most people would be surprised to learn that federal law does not
generally ban discrimination by retailers. Likewise, even legally sophisticated parties
are surprised to learn that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which deals with
public accommodations, does not ban discrimination on the basis of sex.155 The combination of commercial pressure and antidiscrimination laws covering key sectors of
the market is sufficient to ensure access. Indeed, antidiscrimination laws have always
included exemptions of various kinds. Federal antidiscrimination laws exempt religious institutions from aspects of their coverage. 156 Laws prohibiting housing discrimination routinely exempt owner-occupied dwellings or small commercial
units.157

152. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012); see also § 1981(c) (“The rights protected by this
section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment
under color of State law.”).
153. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided
a private cause of action against a private, for-profit school that discriminated on the basis of
race and upholding such authority); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459–60
(1975) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provided a cause of action for private employment
discrimination based on race independent of the cause of action provided under Title VII).
154. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (“If respondent on
remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he
was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will
have made out a case under § 1981.”).
155. See, e.g., Mike Dorf, Arizona SB 1062 Post-Mortem: Statewide, It Would Chiefly
Have Licensed Sex Discrimination. That’s Right, Sex Discrimination, DORF ON LAW (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/02/arizona-sb-1062-post-mortem-it-would.html [https://
perma.cc/4Z7A-LFWZ] (“My first thought on making this discovery was ‘Really?’ It doesn’t
violate federal law for a restaurant to keep out female customers? Holy crap! Why didn’t I
know that?”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2012) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012) (“This subchapter [i.e., Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities.”); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (holding
that the religious exemption to Title VII does not violate the Establishment Clause).
157. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64c(b)(1) (West Supp. 2016) (“The provisions of
this section shall not apply to (A) the rental of a room or rooms in a single-family dwelling
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Ardent supporters of the public theory of the market are likely to object that the
doux commerce approach, by making the extent of both antidiscrimination laws and
religious exemptions empirically contingent, fails to properly recognize the dignity
of the individual. Chai Feldblum writes:
If I am denied a job, an apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant, or a procedure by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep,
intense, and tangible hurt. That hurt is not alleviated because I might be
able to go down the street and get a job, an apartment, a hotel room, a
restaurant table, or a medical procedure from someone else. The assault
to my dignity and my sense of safety in the world occurs when the initial
denial happens. That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others might
not treat me in the same way.158
These objections are not without substance. The targets of religiously motivated
discrimination can insist that for market actors to refuse to contract with them is
humiliating. If the law tolerates such behavior, it refuses to protect gays and lesbians
against these psychic harms.159 This refusal is an affront to their dignity.
Notice, however, that the claims of individual dignity can be arrayed on both sides
of the question. The conscientious objector can insist that an appreciation for individual dignity demands that we accommodate religious conscience. To coerce or
punish someone whose behavior is dictated by conscience fails to treat their choices
and their religious identity with respect. Indeed, gay-rights advocates themselves reject the idea that one can sanction or discriminate on the basis of homosexual conduct
without discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation. 160 As Thomas Berg points
out, “Religious liberty claims face similar attempts to dismiss them as conduct, subject to any and all state regulation.”161 The dignity of a religious believer told that

unit if the owner actually maintains and occupies part of such living quarters as his residence
or (B) a unit in a dwelling containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by
no more than two families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains
and occupies the other such living quarters as his residence.”).
158. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 153.
159. See Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer’s Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 210 (1995) (“Discrimination has both instrumental
and symbolic consequences. . . . [D]iscrimination is about insult and psychic injury as well as
access to goods, and the state’s interest in avoiding those harms may be very strong indeed.”).
160. As Feldblum puts the point:
Particularly as a means of dealing with the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick, some
legal advocates had argued that their clients should not be discriminated against
for the status of being gay, although they deliberately failed to claim equal nondiscrimination rights for their clients’ rights to engage in gay conduct. From the
moment I became aware of this legal approach, I have detested it and argued
against it. It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness, absurdity, and indeed,
disrespect to tell someone that it is permissible to “be” gay, but not permissible
to engage in gay sex. What do they think being gay means?
Feldblum, supra note 41, at 142–43 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
161. Berg, supra note 41, at 214. To her credit, Feldblum acknowledges this symmetry,
nevertheless insisting that antidiscrimination laws should triumph over conflicting claims of
religious believers’ dignity. See Feldblum, supra note 41, at 142–55. Other opponents of
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she may have her beliefs in private but will be punished or driven out of business if
she acts out those beliefs in her commercial life is not respected. Taken in purely
individualistic terms, it is difficult to determine whose dignity suffers the greatest
affront or even if the dignity of one actor can be traded off against another actor. 162
At worst, such disputes degenerate into mere tribalism, with “dignity” acting as little
more than a label signifying the tribe with which the speaker most closely identifies.
The indifference of the doux-commerce argument to the claims of personal affronts
to dignity is thus a conceptual advantage, not a weakness.163 Peaceful and productive
cooperation in a pluralistic society is a sufficiently ambitious goal.
In fairness, I should note that there is nothing in the doux-commerce theory that
limits this analysis to discrimination based on sexual orientation.164 Consider Title II
of 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in public accommodations. In his concurrence in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, which upheld the constitutionality of the 1964 Act, Justice Goldberg quoted the Senate
Commerce Committee:
The primary purpose . . . is to solve this problem, the deprivation of
personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments. Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment

religious exemptions, however, have acknowledged the problem of limiting gay rights to a
purely private sphere while failing to recognize the symmetrical structure of religious believers
concerns with a purely privatized or internal religious faith. Compare Underkuffler, supra note
41, at 2077 (“If the discrimination [against a religious person] is truly rooted in the individual’s
conduct, and not in religious affiliation or identity, then it is not odious discrimination in the
way that term is understood here.”) (emphasis in original), with id. at 2082 (arguing that
“[c]onduct may be part of gay or lesbian sexual orientation, but that conduct is simply an
expression of who that person is” and that “‘[h]atred’s targeting of status is primitive, and its
condemnation of behavior an ideologically inspired afterthought’” (quoting RICHARD MOHR,
A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP FOR GAY RIGHTS 65–66
(1994)).
162. As should be clear from the proceeding section, I don’t believe that it is impossible to
make defensible choices in favor of the claims of one group or another. I am skeptical, however, that we can do so based on competing individual claims to affronted dignity. Cf.
Koppelman, supra note 36, at 620 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws should be thought of
as a tool for systemic social engineering rather than providing individual recourse for a tortlike wrong).
163. I admire the intellectual honesty of both Thomas Berg and Chai Feldblum in forthrightly acknowledging the symmetrical structure of claims by gays and lesbians and religious
believers. I find it striking that while their analysis is very similar, they come to diametrically
opposed conclusions, and I do not believe that either of them offers a compelling reason
grounded in concern for personal dignity for preferring the claims of one group over those of
the other.
164. See Melling, supra note 41, at 180–83 (accusing those favoring religious accommodations of refusing to apply their analysis to antidiscrimination law outside of the context of
sexual orientation); Underkuffler, supra note 41, at 2083 (same). But see EPSTEIN, supra note
67, at 1–12 (criticizing antidiscrimination law generally); Epstein, supra note 67, at 1246–49
(same).
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that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as
a member of the public . . . .165
The system of racial segregation attacked by Title II was deeply unjust. In this, I
agree with Justice Goldberg. The injustice, however, did not arise from the fact that
occasionally African Americans encountered racist business owners that denied them
service.166 To that extent, I believe Justice Goldberg was mistaken.
Rather, the injustice of segregation in the market arose from the fact that African
Americans had to operate in a society in which there were pervasive denials of their
access to goods and services. The problem was not individual acts of discrimination,
but a market so infested with institutions and practices based on white supremacy
that it denied African Americans meaningful economic opportunity. 167 Furthermore,
given the pervasiveness of discrimination against African Americans, Congress was
correct to grant only very limited religious exemptions from the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. It is difficult to know for certain, but given the common religious justifications
for segregation, coupled with the reality of pervasive discrimination by employers
and businesses, it would have been reasonable to suppose that more generous exemptions would have been widely invoked.
Such conclusions, however, are empirically contingent. If I may be forgiven a
personal example, as a college student I was explicitly told by a landlord that he did
not wish to rent to me because of my religion. Notwithstanding the landlord’s action,
however, I continued to operate in a world where the market provided me with ample
opportunities. This was literally a once-in-a-life-time experience that did not meaningfully restrict my ability to lead a productive and prosperous life. In short, my position was emphatically different than the position of an African American turned
away from a lunch counter in 1963. This does not mean that vicious verbal attacks
on individual dignity should be left without a legal remedy. The proper remedy for
such attacks, however, lies with torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.168 Indeed, elsewhere, I have been critical of the Supreme Court’s limiting of
such torts on free-speech grounds.169

165. 379 U.S. 241, 291–92 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. NO. 88-872,
at 16 (1964)).
166. Indeed, encountering those with objectionable opinions is part of living in a pluralistic
society, and generally free speech values keep us from providing legal relief from “the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment” that a person feels “when he is told” something by another. Even speech torts like intentional infliction of emotional distress require greater individualized harm than Justice Goldberg suggests here.
167. This point should be clear when one considers the concerns that remain for African
American equality in a world in which businesses willingly provide them with services, but
where deficiencies of educational and economic opportunity continue to condemn millions of
black citizens to poverty.
168. Richard Delgado, for example, has argued that when individuals are subject to extreme and targeted racial insults, they should be given a tort cause of action. See Delgado,
supra note 128, at 134–35.
169. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private
Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 1109, 1125–57 (2013) (attacking the Supreme Court’s decision in Snyder
v. Phelps, which denied individual recourse by the targets of vicious homophobic attacks by
the Westboro Baptist Church).
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The humdrum, ideologically blasé world of commerce has its own dignity, not
because it instantiates some thick account of what it means to respect someone’s
deepest identity but because it allows for peaceful cooperation in the face of pervasive disagreement on deeper questions. Hence, while the doux-commerce argument
provides no way of prioritizing the claims of affronts to individual dignity, it can
balance the claims of antidiscrimination and religious conscience. It does so, however, socially and in terms of the market as a whole rather than any particular individual.170 The targets of religiously motivated discrimination are entitled to protection when their ability to participate fully in the market is threatened. In such cases,
the dignity of religious objectors must be subordinated to the requirements of peaceful commerce. Doing so, however, is not a judgment on the value of their personal
dignity but on the effects of their behavior on the shape of the market. Likewise,
where gays and lesbians enjoy broad access to goods and services and religious objectors to providing wedding cakes or nuptial photographs are rare, the douxcommerce argument provides no reason for punishing those who refuse to contract
on the basis of religious belief. This is not a judgment as to the worth or dignity of
gays and lesbians. Rather, it is a judgment that the market is functioning as it should
and that in the end ordinary commercial intercourse will do more to soften the edges
of religious conviction than will fines and lawsuits.171
CONCLUSION
Discussions of law and religion should encompass more than debates about the
relationship between church and state. In the modern world, much of the regulatory
energy of the state is devoted toward shaping the character of the market. Not surprisingly, many of the flash points in current debates over law and religion arise in a
commercial context. We face questions not merely of whether and how the state may
regulate religious conduct or whether and how the state’s conduct may be infused

170. The doux-commerce argument for antidiscrimination laws is analogous to
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review, which argues that courts should overturn
ordinary political outcomes only to keep open the channels of the democratic process. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
Analogous to constitutional arguments made by John Ely and others, I am arguing that the
purpose of antidiscrimination laws is not to eradicate individual encounters with prejudice in
the marketplace, but to clear the channels of commerce to ensure that all have meaningful
access to the market. Notice that in both arguments, the redress of individual rights violations
is subordinated to systemic concerns. Cf. Laycock, supra note 66, at 200 (arguing that religious
believers cannot be allowed to close off “choke points” in the market based on their religious
beliefs). I’m grateful to my colleagues Tara Grove and Allison Larsen for pointing out this
connection.
171. Such a view isn’t, of course, neutral in any absolute sense. It assumes that neither
same-sex couples nor religious objectors to same-sex marriage are so depraved that they must
be driven from the public view or from the polity entirely. Such a judgment will offend zealots
convinced that their cultural opponents must be suppressed or confined to the private sphere.
Cf. Feldblum, supra note 41, at 130–34 (arguing that antidiscrimination laws covering sexual
orientation cannot be understood as being entirely neutral on the morality of homosexual acts
precisely because they allow at least for the toleration of such acts). Doux commerce is a way
of handling deep pluralism rather than suppressing or minimizing it.
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with religious content. We must also confront the question of how religion ought to
relate to commercial life. What is the proper relationship between church and
market?
Because markets are social creations, the laws that shape the market will determine the relationship between religion and commerce. To be sure, other factors—not
the least of which is the content of the religious beliefs that command a significant
following in society—will also determine this relationship. 172 Nevertheless, every
time the law regulates religious conduct in the market, it is consciously or unconsciously instantiating a view of how religion ought to relate to commerce. My
central goal in this Article is to explicitly articulate what I take to be the implicit
assumptions that frequently determine conclusions about how religious conduct in
the market ought to be regulated, and defend my favored approach. The public and
private theories that I have articulated are interpretive reconstructions rather than
summaries of the positions explicitly espoused by others. Something like these assumptions, however, seems to lie behind many people’s intuitions about these questions. On one side is the effort to extend liberal-democratic norms of institutional
legitimacy into the market. On the other side are those who argue that markets ought
to be creatures entirely of contract. As an alternative to these two approaches, I have
articulated a doux-commerce theory that sees markets primarily in terms of their social functions but does not tie those functions to the instantiation of liberaldemocratic norms.
Applying these three approaches to current debates about same-sex marriage,
antidiscrimination laws, and religious accommodations yields three quite different
results. The public theory is ambiguous. For some it counsels in favor of the aggressive application of antidiscrimination laws regardless of the background market conditions. Others argue that the liberal norms that ought to constrain market actors imply that religious conduct in the commercial sphere must be protected. The private
theory by and large rejects the legitimacy of antidiscrimination laws as interfering
with freedom of contract. The doux-commerce theory offers empirically contingent
answers, depending on both the level of discrimination within society and the extent
to which members of society hold particular religious beliefs. At the heart of this
empirical balancing is the conviction that markets must be open to all but that eroding
freedom of contract tends to undermine the ability of commerce to perform important
work in a pluralistic society. Likewise, a pervasively religious market or one sharply
divided along lines of identity poses its own threats to the ability of commerce to
“gentle” our manners and promote peaceful cooperation. The goal is commerce
where religious people are free to contract as they see fit, including on the basis of
their religious convictions, but where religion does not dominate the market. Ideally,
the law should facilitate a world where the majority of market actors take a distinctly
blasé attitude toward religious, moral, ideological, and other differences.

172. For example, of necessity, the relationship between religion and commerce will look
different if Amish rather than Muslims are the dominant religious group. The former as a
matter of faith eschew much of commercial life while the faith of the latter is arguably particularly hospitable to commerce.

